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The good old rule
Sufficeth then, the simple plan
That they should take who have the power
And they should keep who can.
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INTRODUCTION
T O A NOVICE IN THE LAW, the problems of groundwater rights seem to
straddle awkwardly the physical and social realms. The law-a formal set
of rules by which society is ordered-seems to the physical scientist a strangely
confusing and confused tool with which to define, even in a social context, the
parameters and limits of a physical continuum. For example, on the basis of
attorney's briefs, bolstered even by expert testimony, judges have legally
defined "subterranean streams"' and erected criteria for recognizing such
streams that sound more like the rhetoric of Humpty Dumpty ' than a
description of a body of water one could scoop up in a bucket, or upon
which one could float a rubber raft. On the other hand, it is definitely
possible to float a rubber raft in underground streams, which by legal
definition do not exist. As one reads the cases, it is apparent, that however
necessary such definitions are to the resolution of individual rights to
groundwater, the definitions may transfer poorly from the facts of one
case to those of another, and therefore serve a poor basis for policy.
The problem of definition has been great in the consideration of
groundwater rights law. Each section of the standard reference digests, law
review articles, etc., start or end with definitions. This is usually accompanied
by a discussion of the variously labelled three or four schemes of water rights
followed in the different states.
The people of the United States live under dramatically different
rules regarding the right to produce, use, store, divert and interfere with
groundwater. These different sets of rules, known respectively as the English
(absolute) rule, the American (reasonable use) rule, the correlative rights
2 See 55 Ohio JUR. 2d Waters and Watercourses § 61 (1963); 56 AM. JUR. WATERS §
108 (1962); 93 C.J.S. Waters § 86 (1956).
3 "When I use a word," Humpty-Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means just
what I chose it to mean-neither more or less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether
you can make words mean so many different things." "The question is," said Humpty-
Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all." L. CARROL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS
94 (1946).
4 See Appendix, figs. 1, 2. "Presence of a line of bushes usually found no where except
over water courses" is sufficient to establish an underground stream flowing in a known
defined channel, Hale v. McLea, 53 Cal. 578, 580 (1879). "A subsurface stream...
must be discoverable from the surface of the ground," Logan Gas Co. v. Glasgo, 122
Ohio St. 126, 131, 170 N.E. 874, 876 (1930). Accord, 55 OHIO Jtm. 2d Water and
Watercourses § 61 (1963). Cf. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861); Warder
v. Springfield, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 855 (1885). See also Problem Cases 2 and 18 infra.
But see E. WARNER, Karst Research Becoming "Legitimate," 19 GEOTIMES No. 7, 18
(1974). In discussing Karst, it is there noted that "water flowed with very high gradient
[in subsurface karst terrain]; one test showed an underground flow of 4 miles in 72 hours"
a rate of 5 feet per minute-sluggish, but still a stream.
5 See 93 C.J.S. Waters § 86 (1956); 55 OHIO JuR. 2d Waters and Watercourses § 61
(1963) 56 AM. JUR. Waters § 113-116 (1962).
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rule and the appropriation rule have been discussed repeatedly by symposium
authors, casebook editors, digest compilers and law review writers; they do
not require repetition here.'
The purpose of this paper is to outline the development and status of the
law applicable to groundwater problems in Ohio, to place this law in
the framework of what is called here Groundwater Problem Cases, and to
summarize Ohio law on groundwater rights noting trends, exceptions and
critical turning points. In addition, the paper considers the probable physical
relationships in which groundwater occurs and may be affected by man's
activities, which could result in damage or dispute (the Groundwater Problem
Cases), and to relate these to litigated cases in Ohio, other eastern states and
in western states where necessary for coverage. A brief outline of the Problem
Cases precedes the section on Ohio groundwater rights law to permit reference
to them as part of that discussion.
Groundwater Problem Cases-Overview
As an introduction to the following section, it is worthwhile to point to
the fact that groundwater supply problems result not from a lack of water
generally, but from a combination of factors which are related to the physical
capacity of the subsurface rocks to accumulate, store, transmit and discharge
water on the one hand, and the rules of law which apply to the rights of
exploitation and use of the storage on the other. These then combine with
economical factors which determine the feasibility of obtaining groundwater
in place of other water supplies.
The public interest in groundwater stems from the national trend toward
the increasing use of water for all purposes, a trend suggesting that by 1980 the
country will require about 400 billion gallons a year,7 or twice what it used in
1955. The selection of groundwater as a supply, rather than surface-water
sources, has generally been on the basis of one or more of the following factors:
1. Groundwater may be reached within a few hundred feet of the place
of use, whereas surface water may require several miles of pipelines
and numerous easements;
6 See generally J. BEUSCHER, WATER RIGHTS 65 (1967) [hereinafter cited as BEUSCHER];
C. MYERS & A. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 1-25 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as MYERS]; W. PETTYJOHN, WATER QUALITY IN A STRESSED ENVIRONMENT 255
(1972) [hereinafter cited as PETTYJOHN]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A
(Tent. Draft No. 17, 1973); 55 OHIO JUR. 2d Waters and Watercourses § 61 (1963);
56 AM. JuiR. Waters § 113-16 (1962); 93 C.J.S. Waters § 86 (1956); Annot., 29
A.L.R.2d 1354 (1953); Annot., 109 A.L.R. 395 (1937); Annot., 55 A.L.R. 1385
(1928); Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water Law: What Is Their Future Common
Ground? 7 WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 1, 14 (1958).
7 U.S.D.A., THE YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE-1955. H.R. Doc. No. 32, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 63-74 (1955).
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2. Groundwater may be available in areas where the water in streams
and lakes has already been appropriated for other uses;
3. The yield from wells and springs, generally, fluctuates less than
streamflow in short-term alternating wet and dry periods, owing to the
nature of subsurface conditions;
4. Groundwater is more uniform in temperature, soluble mineral content,
and other physical parameters, and unless stressed by man's activities,
generally is free of bacterial pollution, also due to the nature of
subsurface conditions.
The development of water from surface sources is a necessity where
groundwater can be obtained only at excessive depths below the surface; where
it cannot be obtained at any depth (e.g., no potable-water reservoir rock is
present); where it cannot be obtained in sufficient quantity or quality; where
it is fully appropriated as in some western states; or, where the quality makes it
entirely unsuitable for the intended use, e.g., it is brackish due to marine water
intrusion. Even where groundwater is available, it may be at a disadvantage
as an alternative to surface water in that its production usually includes the
cost of the power to pump it, whereas surface water may produce energy.
The controversial features of groundwater are numerous, as is illustrated
by the Problem Cases. Many disputes, as to the effect of one well on another
or on a spring (Problem Cases 1, 2), have been decided by the courts. Others
have avoided the courts, owing to the high cost of obtaining proof of the
claim. In general, groundwater hydrologists can gain an understanding of
subsurface conditions by scientific and engineering methods which may seem
unusual to the layman. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine that the
physical scientist looking at the law applied to groundwater would be frustrated
by several of its aspects.8 First, there are the legal definitions and applications
of rules of law which separate by legal categories a physical continuum.9 The
scientist may not recognize legal precedent as realistic. Secondly, there is
the common experience that the courts have resolved only a few of the many
possible specific conflicts which could arise from the use or interference with
groundwater supplies,1" and these on varying bases and doctrines.1
Briefly, three groups of Problem Cases are recognized. The first group
encompasses cases involving interference with a groundwater supply and
8 See PIPER, supra note 5, at 23, noting that "to hydrologists the current law seems
confused and a confounding basis on which to attempt to resolve water problems in the
future."
9 See infra Problem Case 18 on the interference with stream flow by use of groundwater
and problems of definition of a spring as surface or groundwater. See generally 93
C.J.S. Waters § 96(b) (1956).
10 See infra Problem Cases 13, 15 and 17.
" See authorities cited note 6 supra.
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distinguishes 17 possibilities including the interference of two wells, a well
with a spring, surface excavation with a well or spring, and a variety of
less common interference problems related to gas storage, salt water intrusion,
groundwater flooding and mining. The second group of two cases covers
the problem of interference with a surface water supply by the use of a
groundwater supply. The third group encompasses cases of damage to
property and other activities by the use of groundwater. The latter eight
cases include problems of damage to mines, adjacent and subjacent property
from groundwater use, enhancement of unstable soil conditions, development
of landslides and other surface damage problems.
From the standpoint of the attorney, however, the legal rules are fixed, or
nearly fixed, at least for the jurisdiction in which he is attempting to win a case
or research and clarify the legal issues. From his point of view the physical
realities of the scientist are facts which are to be ordered in accordance with
applicable statutory law or common law precedent, even if only by analogy.
New sets of facts, previously untested in courts in his or other jurisdiction, must
be fit into the available legal framework. If the legislature has not acted; if no
cases have been decided; or, if no exploratory articles have been written, he
is at a disadvantage in not being able to foresee new fact situations about
to spring from the ground; yet he is willing, required, or even eager to fit
them to the law or the law to them.
To assist in the clarification of the law of water rights in Ohio, the
approach used here is to establish the range of possible groundwater problems
that can arise based on physical considerations, principles of groundwater
accumulation, storage and flow, and on a review of cases from Ohio and
other states. Based on this variety of information, 28 different situations
have been identified which are listed below and discussed in conjunction with
specific court cases in the third section of the report. Where possible, each
of the Problem Cases is illustrated. 2
These Problem Cases are more closely distinguished than any other
available list or discussion, whether in case books on water rights or hydrologic
texts. For the reader unfamiliar with groundwater storage and flow principles,
it is recommended the list be read and compared to the illustrations before
reading the sections on groundwater rights.
STATUS OF COMMON LAW GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN OHIO
Frazier v. Brown-Law of the Biggest Pump
The earliest principle of law on groundwater in Ohio (called percolating
water in many reports") is the so-called English or absolute rule, and is based
12 See Appendix A for a list of Groundwater Problem Cases.
13See 56 AM. JuR. Waters § 111 (1962); 93 C.J.S. Waters § 90 (1956); Appendix B,
figs. 3 & 4.
[Vol. 9:1
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on the legal maxim: cujus est solem ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos. "'
The rule is supported by a number of then persuasive decisions of early
American and English courts, especially in the predominantly rural areas of
this country, which were blessed with substantial groundwater supplies or little
water supply demand. The legal effect of the general principle is that
groundwater extracted from one's land is part of the freehold"5 and derived
from one's ownership of the soil, i.e., the property of the landowner. He
can sink a well, or many wells, or otherwise capture groundwater without
any consideration of the effect of these activities on the use of groundwater
by neighbors. The corollary consequence is that the neighbor may do the
same. The result may be that the landowner with the greater capacity to
produce groundwater (or even to waste it) will do so with impunity. He
may do this without regard to prior uses, without fear of the previous
establishment of a prescriptive right, and without regard to known principles
of groundwater storage and flow."6 The basis for the establishment of
this stance on groundwater rights in Ohio is the 1861 holding of the Ohio
Supreme Court in Frazier v. Brown."
In 1856, the plaintiff, Joseph Frazier, owned and operated a farm in
Fairfield County, Ohio. A spring of water was located near his dwelling which
fed into a small rivulet crossing his land. 8 Frazier used the water for domestic
and agricultural purposes. In October of that year, Jacob Brown, the defendant,
dug a hole on his land. Frazier claimed Brown did it maliciously and wickedly
and for the purpose of destroying Frazier's spring. It did in fact destroy the
spring and caused the rivulet to cease flowing, adversely affecting Frazier's
water supply (a Problem Case 2 situation). The common pleas court found
for the defendant and the case came eventually to the Ohio Supreme Court on
appeal. Apparently, the case was one of first impression in the state.
The defendant, and defendant in error, countered the appeal with four
propositions:
(1) That a landowner's title to subterranean water is the same as to
subterranean rock or other substance, not a mere usufruct, but an
absolute title;
(2) That the rules of law applicable to surface streams, as between
14 Literally translated as: "His is his alone and is from the heavens to the depths of the
earth."
15 See 56 AM. JUR. Waters § 111 (1962): "Percolating water is usually regarded as con-
stituting part of the land in which it is found." See also 93 C.J.S. Waters § 90 (1956).
16 Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955).
17 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861).
is But see 93 C.J.S. Waters § 91 (1956), recognizing a spring as the source of a natural
stream in a riparian state and classifying it as a natural watercourse. Accord, Conobre
v. Fritsch, 92 Ohio App. 520, 111 N.E.2d 38 (1952).
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riparian owners, are not applicable to subterranean waters as
between adjacent proprietors;
(3) That an adjacent proprietor's right to enjoy the use of subterranean
water from another's land is necessarily an easement which must be
founded on grant, either express or implied ... and that mere lapse
of time will not raise the presumption of a grant,... the subject
matter being necessarily secret, hid and the enjoyment thereof
wanting the element of notoriety 9 which is essential to make the
enjoyment adverse, or the basis of prescription; and,
(4) That malicious intent on the part of a landowner in appropriating or
diverting subterranean water on his land, will not give an adjoining
proprietor a right of action against him."
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision for the defendant.
It is important to note that there were several assumptions underlying
Brown's plea, that subsequently were incorporated into the reasoning and
holding of the court, and which are related to the physical realities of
groundwater storage and flow. Implicit in the first proposition is that ground-
water is static rather than fugitive, and hence, is property in the same sense as
rock and valuable mineral deposits. 1 This contradicts known conditions in
almost all groundwater reservoirs, even those not being extracted for human
water supplies. The second proposition assumes that there is an intrinsic
difference between groundwater and surface water, or that they are not related
or relatable.22 This assumption contradicts reality. The court's third proposition
included the presumption that the occurrence of groundwater is necessarily a
matter of mystery. Judge Brinkerhoff maintained that its occurrence was
hidden, secret and not known, knowable or part of common knowledge. The
assertion may have been true in 1861, but hardly can be maintained today.
In weighing the pleas of the parties, the learned Judge Brinkerhoff
carefully considered the prevailing common law of some of the eastern states
and of England in the mid-19th century.23 Judge Brinkerhoff accepted the
then extant and still current legal definitions of waters in Ohio, recognizing
four types: 24 (1) surface streams in well-defined channels; (2) diffused surface
19 "The word notorious, as used in reference to groundwater means that which is publi-
cally or generally known and spoken of," Wyandot Club v. Sells, 6 Ohio N.P. 64, 9 Ohio
Dec. Reprint 106 (1899); 55 OHIO Jun. 2d Waters and Watercourses § 61, n. 21 (1963).
20 12 Ohio St. at 297.
21 See 93 C.J.S. Waters § 88 (1956).
22 But see inIra Problem Case 18.
23 Judge Brinkerhoff's reasoning relied on both American and English precedent cited
throughout the reported decision; see, e.g., Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855);
Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 (1855); Greenleaf v. Francis, 18 Pick. 117 (Mass. 1836);
Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843).
24 C. CALLAHAN, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RIGHTs LAW IN OHIO § 4-9 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as CALLAHAN].
[Vol. 9:1
7
Coogan: Problems of Groundwater Rights in Ohio
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1976
PROBLEMS OF GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN OHIO
water (generally water flowing overland during heavy rains before it enters
a defined channel); (3) subsurface streams which flow in permanent, distinct
and well-defined channels; and, (4) subsurface waters not in permanent,
distinct channels which percolate, ooze or filter through the ground. The
last, commonly known as groundwater, was the principal subject of the
court's opinion. The situation regarding subsurface streams, while important,
was not the focus of the holding in Frazier.
First, it is desirable to closely define the issues decided in Frazier and
the reasons and precedents for the decision in terms of those previously
outlined, before expanding on their extension and effect. They were framed, of
course, by the pleadings and were repeated by the court:
The question then is, whether-in absence of all rights derived either
from contract or legislation-a land owner can have any legal claims in
respect to subsurface waters, which, without any distinct and definite
channel, ooze, filter, and percolate from adjoining lands into his own,
when such waters are diverted, retained, or abstracted by the owner of
such adjoining lands in the use of his property, for any object of either
taste or profit, even though the use may be accompanied by a malicious
intent to injure his neighbor by means of such use? 2
The court answered no, by saying that:
... we are of the opinion that the law of the land can recognize no such
claims; and that subject only to the possible exception of a case of
unmixed malice, the maxim "cujus est solum ejus est usque et ad
infernos" applies to its full extent; and whatever damage may result
from the exercise of this absolute right of property, to adjoining
proprietors from the loss of such percolating subsurface waters, is
damnum absque injuria."
The reasoning of the decision is crucial to our present-day resolution of
water supply problems and management, not only because it has been accepted
almost without question by subsequent courts in Ohio, but because in the light
of modem understanding and public need, a different conclusion may and has
been reached under similar facts and reasoning, but relying upon different
assumptions.27 Judge Brinkerhoff left no doubt as to the basis for his
opinion, upholding the absolute rule. His reasoning was as follows:
Because of the existence, origin, movement and course of such waters,
and the causes which govern and direct their movements, are so secret,
occult and concealed, that an attempt to administer any set of legal rules
25 12 Ohio St. at 304.
26 id.
27 See in/ra Problem Case 1.
Suimmer, 1975]
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in respect to them would be involved in hopeless uncertainty and would
be therefore, practically impossible.
Because any such recognition of correlative right, would interfere, to the
material detriment of the common wealth, with drainage and agriculture,
mining, the construction of highways and railroads, with sanitary
regulations, building and the general progress of improvement in works
of embellishment and utility."
Likewise, he clearly stated the reasons for rejection of any acquisition
of prescriptive rights,2" saying:
That the doctrine of prescription, or presumption of grant from lapse of
time, can have no proper application to the question.., because the
party against whom the doctrine would have to be applied, could not be
reasonably required to enter his caveat against the appropriation of a
thing so hidden and obscure as is percolating underground water.3"
The two principal reasons given by Judge Brinkerhoff in support of
applying the absolute rule in Ohio require separate treatment. His second
reason will be considered first.
Judge Brinkerhoff argued that recognition of a correlative (or presumably
other) right in groundwater would interfere to the material detriment with
commerce and industry. Clearly, his reasons if valid in 1861, can have no
influence today without reconfirmation. Today, in fact, in Ohio there is concern
for a legally acceptable, modern, non-interfering manner of providing for
major water supplies from groundwater sources 1 in the face of the absolute
rule. Many domestic and commercial supplies are destroyed without a
resolution of this problem. The reasoning of Judge Brinkerhoff is contradicted
in states where water is scarce, 2 and where in order to preserve and enhance
agriculture and industry, water management by a state agency using a permit
system requires conservation and limitations on pumping. Obviously, Ohio
must do more than baldly assert that anything but an absolute property right
to groundwater will detrimentally affect commerce and industry in 1975.
Adequate, clean, well-engineered, legally protected water supplies are
essential for civic and industrial growth. 33
28 12 Ohio St. at 311.
29 See 56 AM. JUR. Waters § 115 (1962); 93 C.J.S. Waters § 90, 164 (1956).
30 12 Ohio St. at 311.
31 See notes 120-21 infra and accompanying text.
32 Reis, A Review and Revitalization: Concepts of Ground Water Production and
Management-The California Experience, 7 NAT. RES. J. 53 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Reis].
33According to information from A. Walker, Division of Geological Survey, Ohio
Department of Natural Resources, partly from the unpaged South West Ohio Water Plan(unpublished), there are two important management recommendations regarding
[Vol. 9: I
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There are two elements to the first of Brinkerhoff's reasons requiring
comment. The first element is the assertion, which was taken from earlier
cases, that the nature of groundwater is "secret, occult and concealed," and
the corollary based on this conclusion, that no attempt to administer any set of
rules could be successful. Assuming that these statements were true in 1861,
what is the situation in fact and in law in 1975?
In 1861, one of the few and then best known compendia of geologic
knowledge was Lyell's Principles,3" in its fifth edition of three volumes.
Sir Charles Lyell was a contemporary of Darwin, the latter taking the first
edition on the HMS Beagle3" in the late 1830's. The United States Geological
Survey was formed in 1877 by an explorer of the west, Major Powell, then
busy fighting the Civil War.36 From this state of infancy, scientific knowledge
has grown. By 1975, the United States Geological Survey had published
hundreds of water supply papers; water is a big business and the engineering
and scientific know-how is undisputed.
In 1975, the existence and origin of groundwater and the causes that
govern its movement (principally gravity) are knowable,3" but not necessarily
groundwater supplies for Ohio. Management Recommendation No. 1: "enact legislation
requiring that all groundwater withdrawals for public and private purposes of 100,000
gallons per day or more be reported monthly in an appropriate manner to a single state
data collection agency." Management Recommendation No. 2: "enact legislation giving
the Division of Water of the Department of Natural Resources the right to designate
critical groundwater areas and to regulate all private and public groundwater withdrawals
of 100,000 gallons per day or more within the designated critical area."
34 F. ADAMS, THE BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GEOLOGICAL SCIENCES 266 (2d Ed.
1954).
35 C. DARWIN, THE VOYAGE OF THE BEAGLE 282 (1958).
86 C. FENTON & M. FENTON, GIANTS OF GEOLOGY 239 (1952).
31 See generally BEUSCHER, supra note 5, at 2; MYERS, supra note 5, at 533 et seq.; W.
WALTON & T. PRICKETT, HYDROGEOLOGIC ELECTRIC ANALOG COMPUTERS 67 (1963);
Zeigler, Water Use Under Common Law Doctrines, 7 WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW
51 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Zeigler]. In Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289,
276 S.W.2d 798 (1955), Justice Wilson, in dissent, criticizes the Texas Supreme Court
decision in Houston & T.C.R. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 297 (1904), which
followed Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861), stating at 154 Tex. at 300, 276
S.W.2d at 805:
This dire prediction [in Frazier]--like much prophecy--overlooked the possibility
of advance in knowledge and technique. It is understandable that this rationale
should appeal to this court in 1904 but I regret to see us affirm it now, as the
majority does, in 1955--especially in view of the development since 1904 of our
comprehensive knowledge and experience in oil and gas regulation.
I am convinced that the rationale of Frazier v. Brown has been rebutted and
answered by the course of our history and the entire trend of our jurisprudence
since that decision and since the East case. Although this court can close it eyes
to the advancement of scientific and legal knowledge and governmental techniques
by reaffirming this rationale as the majority do here, I do not believe that this court
will always do so, and for that reason the substance of this dissent seems worth
filing.
Summer, 19751
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or even in some circumstances likely, known by the groundwater supply
interferor or interferee. Accordingly, a standard might be established which
would serve as a guide to determining liability in groundwater supply disputes
(e.g., Problem Cases 1-4). However, one cannot say in 1975 that Frazier v.
Brown could not arise again in spite of well-known scientific knowledge. The
principles of groundwater origin, flow and storage are known-the facts in a
given dispute may not be, or may be too expensive to collect. The more rural
the land, the more shallow the well, the less likely that the interferor will be
aware of the general principles or their application to his own or his
neighbor's land. Anyone can drive a 10- to 20-foot sand-point well; anyone
can dig a swimming pool next door and interfere with that well. Hence, as it
was for Judge Brinkerhoff, the problem of specific knowledge remains today;
but in addition, there has been added the problem of scale."
The second element of Brinkerhoffs reasoning relates to manageability.
He stated that, because of the secret nature of groundwater, "any attempt to
administer a set of legal rules" would meet with "hopeless uncertainty and
practical impossibility." Of course, this is no longer true. Several states have
adopted a permit system for groundwater development administered by a state
agency." A permit system is most common in the western "dry" states (New
Mexico, Colorado, Oregon, etc.), but also has been adopted in Iowa, Indiana
and Florida."0 A permit system presumes the opposite of Brinkerhoff's
assertion. The fact that the permit systems work refutes his assertion. In
addition, it is worthwhile pointing out a famous management problem
in southern California resulting in a dispute between competing pumpers. The
problem was partly resolved in court. Styled as Pasadena v. Alhambra," it is
also commonly referred to as the Raymond Basin adjudication. As described
by Reis" and Beuscher," the situation which was litigated over a decade
resulted in the establishment of a plan of water extraction for a whole basin,
including numerous pumpers, and finally led to legislation in California, which
provided for a cooperative solution to production of scarce groundwater
supplies. The result has been an allocation of some water for almost all, and a
3 8 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1973), stating
the reasons for adopting the exception to non-liability for interference with groundwater
where there is unreasonable harm caused by lowering of the water table by large with-
drawals.
39 See MYERS, supra note 5, at 184 et seq.
40 Plager, Emerging Patterns for Regulation of Consumptive Use of Water in the Eastern
States, 43 IND. L.J. 397 (1968).
4 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949). See also Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 469 (1972).
42 See Reis, supra note 32.
43 See BEUSCHER, supra note 6, at 55: "The Raymond Basin has been protected against
overdraft during the 11-year period ... despite ... one of the worst droughts in the
history of the southwest. In fact, there has been an increase in the 'safe yield' in the 20
years the basin has been under management of about 40% ."
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maintenance of the water level in the basin which provides supply to a large
population. The action brought in 1937 by the City of Pasadena sought to
declare its rights to water in the basin, determine the available water supply,
enjoin all pumping in excess of the "safe yield," and enjoin those with
"inferior" rights." Twenty years later the "safe yield" has increased.
Other successful examples of groundwater management can be selected
from California and New Mexico.45 Hence, it can be demonstrated that with
the requisite scientific and engineering knowledge, groundwater supplies can
(and in some situations must) be managed. Judge Brinkerhoff's conclusion
is without support in 1975, and false in particular where there is sufficient
hydrogeologic knowledge or the money to obtain it."0
What element is left to support the rule of Frazier? It is the problem
of knowledge as opposed to knowability. The question for Ohio in 1975 is:
How one can abandon Frazier in order to promote the general welfare
and at the same time not create another unworkable set of rules? In the
conclusion of the paper, the question of suitable standards and test for
the difference between knowledge and knowability are considered.
Additional Issues Decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio
Four other cases with published opinions reached the Supreme Court of
Ohio, which are pertinent to understanding the common law regarding
groundwater rights in Ohio. These, to be discussed in turn, were Elster v.
Springfield,"' Collieries Co. v. Cocke,'4 The Logan Gas Co. v. Glasgo49
and Barberton v. Miksch."
In Elster v. Springfield," the Ohio court in 1892 was presented with a
dispute between the plaintiff landowner and the City of Springfield. The city
had excavated a part of Center Street to lay pipes for the city's sewer system.
The plaintiff owned property adjoining the street on which he maintained
a spring (or well) 52 in his basement which failed after the sewer construction
began. He brought suit in the common pleas court to recover for the
destruction of his water supply. A verdict for the defendant was certified to
"See Reis, supra note 32.
45 See MYERS, supra note 6, at 184 et seq.
4GAccord, Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 300, 275 S.W.2d 798, 805
(1955) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
4749 Ohio St. 82, 30 N.E. 274 (1892).
Is 107 Ohio St. 238, 140 N.E. 356 (1923).
49 122 Ohio St. 126, 170 N.E. 874 (1930). See also Annot., 55 A.L.R. 1386 (1928).
50 128 Ohio St. 169, 190N.E. 387 (1934).
5 49 Ohio St. 82, 30 N.E. 274 (1892).
52 The common practice of digging out a natural spring and enclosing it as a catchment
makes it difficult to distinguish in older cases between the terms spring and well.
Summer, 1975]
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss1/4
AKRON LAW REVIEW
the circuit court which affirmed for the defendant. Before the supreme
court, the defendant argued that the city did not encroach or trespass on the
plaintiff's property; that the water was not drawn out of the spring but
intercepted before reaching the spring; and, that the plaintiff is not entitled to
recover under the rule of Frazier. The court answered the issue by stating that:
[T] he law, at least in Ohio, is settled to the effect that no right exists in
the owner of one piece of land to receive percolation through the land
of another, and that such a right cannot be acquired by prescription. The
same rule must apply to a spring supplied by percolating waters. We
regard these questions as entirely covered by the case of Frazier v.
Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, and the authorities there cited, and discussion
of them here would be superfluous. From these rules it results that in
water percolating through the earth under Center Street, or under the
surface of lands of others in the vicinity of the spring, the plaintiff
had no ownership, nor had he a right to insist that they should flow
as they had theretofore flowed.53
There were other issues not pertinent to this discussion also considered by
the court. There was no doubt in the court's mind that the water previously
available to Elster was interfered with by the city's excavation. In the discussion
of the facts, it was noted that the walls of the sewer were not made water
tight, the water of the spring and water from sources which had supplied the
spring were carried off in part under the walls of the sewer and in part by
seepage through the walls of the sewer. The syllabus of the court states:
No right by prescription can exist as to percolating water, nor is one
prevented from making any lawful and legitimate use of his own
land, by digging or otherwise, even though the effect is to drain a
spring on the land of an adjoining proprietor. Injury to the spring,
therefore, by draining it, or cutting off water supplied to it by percolation,
would not, per se, be actionable.5"
The issue before the court is referrable to Problem Case 3 and is not
identical with that decided by Frazier, a Problem Case 2 situation. In this
regard, the court extended the rule with regard to the common law in
Ohio, although it did follow the precedent from other jurisdictions as to
the extent and applicability of the absolute rule. It also followed the cases
cited in Frazier which were based on a Problem Case 3 situation.55
-3 49 Ohio St. at 99-100, 30 N.E. at 278.
54 Id. at 84, 30 N.E. at 275.
,5 Accord, In Re Conservancy District, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 325 (1925) which involved
another ditching, where the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County concluded
that the loss of groundwater is not the subject of damages in Ohio unless made so by
contract. Lacking any provision for such loss in the contract between the City of Dayton
and the Miami Conservancy District, there was no right of action because of loss by the
city of a well owing to the lowering of the bed of the Mad River by about three feet.
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In 1923 a case came to the Ohio Supreme Court in which the Ohio
Collieries and the National Coal Company had been sued by landowners for
damage to the surface of their lands owing to the subsurface removal of
coal. The two cases, Ohio Collieries Co. v. Cocke and National Coal Co. v.
Goflee" were joined at the higher court. The situation was that the coal
companies had failed to leave sufficient support pillars, as is customarily
required in careful mining. The result was the collapse of the strata and subsi-
dence above the collapse zone which affected the ground surface. Among the
several issues certified to the court was the question of whether there can be
recovery for a loss of springs or wells, fed by groundwater, which is the result
of subsidence. Viewed in geological terms, this is a Problem Case 24 situation.
The court in considering the question repeated the rule of Frazier, but
distinguished this case from those previously considered. Here the court said:
[A] clear line of distinction is to be drawn between those where the
loss of spring or well is due to subsidence of surface on the account
of withdrawal of proper subjacent support and those where loss of
percolating water is due simply to removal of coal. The cases relied upon
by plaintiff in error are the cases that refer to loss of percolating water
on account of removal of coal.5"
The court noted that this distinction (the difference between a Problem
Case 2 and 5 or 6 situation) was well made in the case of Wills Creek Coal
v. Stage,58 a common pleas court decision affirmed without report by the
Supreme Court of Ohio, where the charge to the jury stated, in part:
See also Wyandot Club Co. v. Sells, 6 Ohio N.P. 64, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 106 (C.P. 1899)
(Problem Case 3 situation) in which the defendant, Sells, apparently excavated a quarry
site and interfered with plaintiff's spring. The case, as reported, consists only of the
charge to the jury. It has been cited as bearing on the question of malicious intent by
the defendant to destroy plaintiff's spring and generally supporting the view that if there
is a case of unmixed malice, the defendant could be held liable in spite of the otherwise
strict application of the English Rule. See, e.g., CALLAHAN, supra note 24, at § 52; OHIO
LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMM'N, WATER RIGHTS IN OHIO, RESEARCH REPT. No. 1 16
(1955) [hereinafter cited as WATER RIGHTS]. See also 27 OHIO DIGEST Waters and
Watercourses § 103 (West 1950), which cites the case for definitions of groundwater
and subsurface streams and for well-known tests for a subsurface stream; Dissette v.
Lowrie, 6 Ohio N.P. 392, 9 Ohio C. Dec. 545 (1899), which was a case of construction
interference, and is an example of a Problem Case 3 situation, was litigated at the trial
level without appeal. The locale was Glenville on St. Clair St. in Cleveland, Ohio, which
was undergoing suburban development in 1899. The developer had cut into the land to
drain it and install water pipes which diverted the flow of a pond. The court found for
the defendant developer citing the rule in Frazier and stating that the plaintiff could not
improve his land on the basis of another's land, the opposite of what had happened.
56 107 Ohio St. 238, 140 N.E. 356 (1923).
57 Id. at 259, 140 N.E. at 362.
58177 Ohio St. 643, 84 N.E. 1135 (1908). Accord, Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855);
93 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 274 (1956), stating: "as a general rule, persons engaged
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If... the taking out of the coal destroyed the sources of waters in the
coal, then the company is not liable; but if the water was diverted from
the well by reason of the fact that the defendant removed the support
or weakened the support of the premises in which were the sources of
the water, then the company is liable, because it had no right to weaken
and destroy the support of the premises of the plaintiff.... ."
Basically, the rule regarding the right to subsurface support was
established, as noted in Collieries, in Burgner v. Humphrey." This rule holds
that if an owner of land grants a lease whereby he conveys all the underlying
minerals, with the right to mine and remove the coal, the lessee will not be
entitled to remove the whole of the coal without leaving support sufficient
to maintain the surface in its natural state. 1
With regard to water rights, the holding of the Ohio Supreme Court in
Collieries speaks to the situation illustrated in Problem Case 24, and is to be
distinguished from the situation in Problem Case 23 where the pumping
of groundwater from an excavation (or another well) might cause damage to
the surface of the land. This situation has been litigated in Ohio, but only
in the context of removal of lateral support, and not as a groundwater problem.
In 1930, the Ohio Supreme Court faced an issue already decided in
Frazier 69 years previously."2 Glasgo, the plaintiff (defendant in error), had
owned a 173-acre farm in Ashland County with a dwelling which was supplied
with water from a spring nearby. Within a few days after the Logan Gas Co.
began drilling a gas well on the adjacent farm about one-half mile away from
the Glasgo spring, the flow of water decreased and the spring later became
dry. Subsequently, the spring filled only following heavy rains, and remained dry
during the summer, requiring the plaintiff to drill a deeper well to obtain a
sufficient supply of water. Lying between the Glasgo property and the gas well
was another farm of one Haudenschield where a spring was located which was
not disturbed by the drilling. The case came to the supreme court from the
court of appeals of Ashland County. It was also reported, in the trial
of the case, that the drilling company had sunk a water well near the
in ordinary mining operations are not responsible for damages to flow of percolating
waters" citing Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 236 Ala. 173, 181 So. 276
(1938).
59 107 Ohio St. at 259, 140 N.E. 363.
O 41 Ohio St. 340 (1919).
01 Compare Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) where this physical
problem was considered and where the state law which countermanded the effect of a
contract between the landowner (passed through several hands) and the mine owners
and owners of the subsurface coal, so that the miners had no liability for subsidence
from removal of coal, was held to be unconstitutional as a state "taking."62 Logan Gas Co. v. Glasgo, 122 Ohio St. 126, 170 N.E. 874 (1930).
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gas well, from which water flowed, and this supposed interference also became
a basis for a claim. At the trial court, the defendant, Logan Gas Co., offered
no evidence, but moved for a directed verdict. The motion was overruled
and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, Glasgo, in the amount of
$3,000. The judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals.
At the Ohio Supreme Court, the question became simply one of whether
the facts warranted any recovery as judged in the trial court, the law
presumably being clear, i.e., the rule of Frazier. The plaintiff claimed, of
course, that the drilling of a well on higher ground by Logan Gas Co. diverted
an underground channel of water. The court quickly noted that the plaintiff
could recover only on the theory that the facts showed the water to be in an
underground stream, citing the well-known presumption of water law (by this
date) that groundwaters are considered to be percolating if "it does not appear
that the waters which come to the surface are supplied by a definite flowing
stream."63 It cited the still current evidentiary rule that one who claims rights
in an underground flowing stream has the burden of showing its existence. The
test it accepted was that "a subsurface stream ... must be discoverable from
the surface of the ground."6 It is quite generally held, the court said, "that
an underground stream,... the direction and course of which can only be
discovered by excavation, is not a known stream governed by the rules
applicable to surface water courses.""
Clearly, the court did not envision the tools of modern science, especially
those of geophysics, but it thoroughly anticipated the testimony of expert
witnesses, seemingly preferring the lowest common denominator of knowledge,
when it applied the test that:
The rule has been quite generally adopted... that the requirement as to
a known and defined channel places the burden upon the plaintiff...
to show that without opening the ground by excavation, or having
recourse to abtuse speculations of scientific persons, men of ordinary
powers and attainments would know, or could with reasonable diligence
ascertain, that the stream, when it emerges into light, comes from and
has followed through a defined subterranean channel.6"
This gratuitous judicial observation on the pertinence of scientific and
engineering judgments on practical affairs is somewhat below the dignity of
the court, however close it is to the probable truth that most groundwater is
68 id. at 129, 170 N.E. at 875.
64 1d. See generally 55 Omo JuR. 2d Waters and Watercourses § 51 (1963), citing Logan
Gas Co. v. Glasgo, 122 Ohio St. 126, 170 N.E. 874 (1930). Accord, 93 C.J.S. Waters
§ 86 (1956): ". . . and not discoverable from surface indications without excavations for
that purpose." See also 56 AM. JuR. Waters § 108 (1962).
65 122 Ohio St. at 131, 170 N.E. at 876.
66Id. at 131, 170 N.E. at 876.
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percolating. From the geological standpoint, Logan Gas is an example of
Problem Case 14 if the interference resulted from the drilling of the gas well
and Case 1 if from the interference of one water well with another. The case
added little to the development of groundwater law in Ohio except a little
folk wisdom disguised as a test for determining the difference between
percolating waters and underground streams.
In the case of Barberton v. Miksch,17 Jerome Miksch owned a 76-acre
tract of land in the valley of Wolfe's Creek in Summit County which was
suitable and available, both for farming and sale in acreage tracts. The City of
Barberton had its own problems, a lack of water. In its function as a municipal
corporation, the city constructed a reservoir, called the Barberton Reservoir,
and the resultant rise in the groundwater table in the adjacent land caused
water to flow through the ground onto and into the land of Miksch. The
plaintiff (defendant in error) claimed that this new-found water "rendered
his land sour, wet, swampy and permanently unfit and unsuitable for use
as farm land or for a subdivision or any other useful or valuable purpose."
He was awarded a sum of $3,500 by the trial court and the decision was
affirmed by the court of appeals.
Several issues in the case as decided by the Ohio Supreme Court are not
pertinent here, inasmuch as they address the standing of his widow to sue and
the status of the city in a proprietary role. The water issue, which the court
faced, was whether the water which seeped and percolated into Miksch's land
as the result of the construction constituted a trespass? The court answered
yes. It did not dwell on its reasons, simply stating that they were in conformity
with the previous uniform decisions of the court holding that, under the
circumstances, liability is not dependent upon negligence, and noting that
a discussion of a few of the cases had already appeared in Mansfield v.
Balliett.9 Interestingly, the court did not approach the issue as one relating
to groundwater; that is, it did not address it as an example of a Problem
Case 2, but instead as a case of trespass related to surface storage of water,
presumably with roots in case law back to Rylands v. Fletcher.9
Ohio Lower Court Decisions
So little of importance regarding varied problems of groundwater has
been decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio after Frazier that a substantial
portion of the comment and citation of Ohio groundwater law revolves around
67 128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E. 287 (1934).
68 65 Ohio St. 451, 63 N.E. 86 (1902), where the issue was one of the city's use of
Balliett's farm for public purposes without compensation and the creation of a private
nuisance caused by discharge of sewage on Balliett's farm from a stream into which the
city dumped the raw sewage, not an entirely comparable set of circumstances.69 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), afl'gL.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866).
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one circuit court case from 1893 on an underground stream and its interfer-
ence with a spring, and three cases heard in the courts of common pleas in
1885, 1899 and 1924. These will be briefly reviewed for the purpose of noting
new elements, definitions and tests introduced for the situations already
considered, and because there are Problem Cases, not yet discussed,
adjudicated in these reports. Finally, they require discussion because they
are widely regarded and cited as the substantive water law in Ohio.7"
The City of Springfield is distinguished in Ohio by its history of at least
100 years of water supply problems. The case of Warder v. Springfield7 is but
one episode in that struggle to gain an adequate supply. The case has been
quoted and cited, probably because it considers a complicated fact situation,
cites considerable precedent, and details the problem of water rights in
groundwater and stream water where these rights interfere. From a
hydrological standpoint, the case also clearly points out the established
relationship between groundwater and stream water. The final court order
restricted the pumper from taking stream water through the ground.
The facts in the case fall under the situation described as Problem Case
18. Warder and his partner Barnett were the proprietors of a flour mill in the
City of Springfield. The mill was located on the bank of Buck Creek from
which they obtained water as a riparian owner. Barnett had constructed a dam
and a canal, or race, which ran from the dam about 8,000 feet to the mill. The
riparian right was conceded. The city, in order to obtain a better water supply,
proposed to lay pipe along the creek about 2.5 miles north of the dam and to
pump groundwater into the pipe. The groundwater was to be obtained from a
parcel of land of about seven acres, purchased by the city, which lies between
the confluence of Buck Creek and a plainly marked channel of a spring branch
of Beaver Creek. During the construction of the well field between the two
creeks, pumps were installed to drain the land below the water table to enable
the contractor to lay pipe. He had to use pumps with a combined capacity
of one and one-half million gallons per day. The result of the pumping was
that the water in the spring branch disappeared, as did the standing water
in the marshes in the vicinity. To the east of Buck Creek and north of
Beaver Creek, on higher ground, two wells went dry during the pumping. On
cessation of pumping, the water reappeared in these wells.
The question to be answered by the court was to what extent, if at all, the
plaintiffs had a right to waters which the city would take by reason of
construction and maintenance of the well field. It would seem under the rule
of Frazier that the city would have an absolute right to obtain all the
T0 See CALLAHAN, supra note 24; 55 OHIO JuR. 2d Waters and Watercourses § 59
etseq. (1963).
719 Ohio Dec. Reprint 855 (1855).
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groundwater it could pump from its land without regard to any potential
interference with the level of the adjacent creeks. The Warder court repeated
this rule stating that: "Such waters, coming from no one knows where and
flowing no one knows whence, are not property."72
Of course, the court and the parties knew very well where the water came
from-the creeks, and they knew where it went or was going to-into the
city's water pipes. The plaintiff would be harmed by the city's diversion of
the creek upstream from his dam and race in that the water supply behind the
dam would.be diminished or be non-existent, and his riparian right would
be valueless without water in the stream. The theory of the plaintiff was
that all the water in and about a section of land which would supply
the defendant's reservoir would be drawn directly or by filtration from the
creeks. The defendant claimed that it would all come from percolating
water. The court found that there was:
A strong, steady flow of water into the bottom through the gravel as from
a supply basin. This supply is doubtless largely furnished from the water
suspended in the.. . gravel and drawn from higher lands to the east.
There is a supply of water upon the surface ... and percolating in the
soil, not in defined channels to which plaintiffs have no right, and which
defendants may lawfully take....
If it were not for future rainfall, this supply would under the enormous
drain of nearly two million gallons per day, made by the reservoir and
pipes connected with the city pumping house, become ultimately
exhausted. The draft would then inevitably begin upon the waters
sustaining the waters in the creeks and then quickly upon the waters of
the creeks themselves. 3
The court then stated its duty to determine how much the city may
rightfully appropriate without invading the plaintiff's property rights." The
court relied on the experience and pumping history of the construction.
The defendant, of course, argued that the drying of the creeks was not the
result of withdrawal of water after it is in the channel of the creek, but
by intercepting the percolating water before it reaches the channel. The
court dismissed this contention as one not proven by the defendant, regardless
of its possible legal consequences, and cited the proposition of the English
case of Grand Junction Canal Co. v. Slugar that "if you cannot get at the
72 Id. at 861, presumably referring to the law of capture.
73 Id. at 863.
74 Cf. Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855), standing for the proposition that there are
"perfect rights," presumably the riparian property right here, and "imperfect rights,"
such as the right to capture water, which are held to have less advantage. But see Higday
v. Nicholaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1971), Problem Case 1 as between two pumpers
and the unresolved reverse situation in Problem Case 9.
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underground water without touching the water in a defined surface channel, I
think you cannot get at it at all." 5
The Warder court concluded by citing its duty to protect the citizen
in the enjoyment of his property, through the use of an injunction, from
unlawful encroachments of others whether attempted by municipal or private
corporations. It held that the city had no right to destroy the easement of the
plaintiffs in the dam and race by withdrawing water flowing in the channels
of Buck or Beaver creek or the spring branch so as to reduce the waters of
Buck Creek at the plaintiff's dam below their ordinary level. The court then
specifically enjoined the defendant "from withdrawing water from their
reservoir... to exceed a half million gallons of water per day."7
The case has been extensively quoted here for several points it makes, for
its holding, which contradicts the established rule, and because it customarily is
cited not for what it holds, but for the contrary! In Warder the court clearly
accepts the known and demonstrated physical continuity between the
groundwater in the city's land and the stream level of the spring branch. In
spite of its citation of Frazier as the well-settled rule, it holds contrary to
Frazier that a landowner does not have an absolute right to percolating water
but has a limited right-limited to the extent that his withdrawal of groundwater
does not interfere wih stream flow. Note that one of the cases relied on by the
court in Frazier, Chasemore v. Richards,7 was also a Problem Case 18
situation as was Warder. Contrary to what the Warder court said it was
doing, it is clear that the holding can be cited for the proposition that there
are correlative rights in groundwater versus stream water, and may even be
cited for the concept that the prior appropriator of the stream water, that
is, the senior appropriator in the terminology of the non-riparian states,
should be guaranteed his supply."8
The court's reasoning is quite in line with the physical facts of ground-
water movement, makes good hydrologic sense, but is not in line with
the well-settled common law of Ohio. Apparently, the case was not appealed.
It is interesting to note that authoritative reference works cite Warder in
75 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint at 863.
76 Id. at 864.
77 2 Hurl & Norman Rep. 982 (1857).
78 Accord, Meeker v. East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 75 A. 379 (1909). See also RESTATE-
MENr (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 858A (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1973), stating (a) that the
interferor is not subject to liability unless "The withdrawal of water has a direct and
substantial effect upon the water of a watercourse or lake. . ." and the comment to clause
(c) citing no reasons other than it is an interference with the watercourse although
occurring outside the channel which defines the watercourse (!). But what effect if the
interferor cannot foresee, or in fact cannot know even subsequent to the pumping, that
he is drawing down the stream?
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support of the rule of Frazier."9 It appears that for an instant in 1887, Ohio
had at least in part adopted the reasonable use or appropriation rule as
between riparian and groundwater users. The case is in accord with majority
holdings, but not with the spirit or reasoning that supports Frazier v. Brown."
The issues in Castalia Trout Club v. Castalia Sporting Club,," were
decided in the Erie Circuit Court in 1893. The facts are complicated and
difficult to visualize from the report of the case. Had the court not found that
the spring owned by the Castalia Trout Club was fed by an underground
stream, the case would illustrate the Problem Case 2 situation, as it probably
should, if one adheres to the proposition that groundwater is percolating.
However, the court found that there was indeed an underground stream issuing
from the limestone to establish Big Cold Creek. It therefore applied the law
pertinent to the rights of riparian owners and consequently Castalia is not a
case involving rights to percolating waters. Rather, it is frequently cited for
the definition of a subterranean stream. If presented to a court today, it seems
probable the presumption that all groundwater is percolating would be
difficult to overcome and the case would be decided on the basis of the rule
of Frazier, i.e., for the defendant rather than against him.
The plaintiff in Lewis v. Mount Adams and Eden Park Inclined Plane
Ry. Co., 2 residing in Hamilton County, claimed that the railway company
excavated footings for two piers to hold up the tracks. The excavation
interfered with the groundwater flow onto his property, increasing it, and
making the ground soggy. As the earth softened, his house settled and cracked.
This is a Problem Case 26 situation. There was no opinion reported by
the court, but the charge to the jury as reported was that: "[t]hough the
defendant may have dug below [the groundwater] nine feet, unless actual
injury resulted therefrom to the plaintiff it would not give him a right to
recover." 3 The district court, in summarily affirming the trial court's ruling
below, stated that, while a party has no right to throw water on the land of
an adjacent landowner, an action cannot be maintained for the diversion of a
subsurface stream onto adjacent property if its course was unknown.
As noted, the opposite conclusion was reached in Miksch, " which
79 See CALLAHAN supra note 24, at § 51; 55 OHIO JuR. 2d, Water and Watercourses
§ 67 (1963).
80 See WATER RIGHTS supra note 55, at 16, in which the Ohio Legislative Service cites
Warder together with Frazier to support the proposition that: "it seems the well-settled
rule of law in Ohio that a landowner may make full use of the waters percolating
beneath the surface of his land. He is not liable for damages if neighboring owners lose
their water as a result of his operations."
8" 8 Ohio C. Dec. 693 (1893), aJff'd 56 Ohio St. 749 (1897).
82 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 566, Wk. Law Bull. 1007 (1878).
Is Id. at 567.
4 128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E. 287 (1934).
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presumably overrules this case, although it can be distinguished by the
fact that in Miksch one party was a governmental agency. For further
precedent on this point see the discussion of Problem Case 27.
Summary of Ohio Groundwater Law
The current status of groundwater law in Ohio, based on Ohio Supreme
Court cases, is that there have been only a few issues actually decided. Specifi-
cally, only those outlined as Problem Cases 1, 2, 3, 14, 18, 23, 24 and 26 have
been decided, none having been ruled upon in about the last 40 years.
The situation is summarized by Callahan in his introduction to Principles
of Water Rights in Ohio, 5 where he states that the fundamental case law on
the use of water in Ohio is more than 50 years old (in 1957) and the issues
have not been reexamined in later cases. He quotes a remark by Justice
C. William O'Neill referring to the "cabin on the bank" nature of Ohio's
system of water law and stresses that these cases cannot reflect the water
problems of a modern industrial state."
In groundwater interference cases, the Ohio Supreme Court has applied
the absolute rule which prevails whether the interferor is appropriating the
water by means of a well, 7 an excavation,"8 a mine," or otherwise. Also,
pumpers interfering with springs" are not liable for damages. But, damage
to the surface of the land from mining, which thereby affects the water supply,
is actionable.91 Contrary to what might be expected by adhering to the absolute
rule which makes appropriated groundwater property, it is suggested at a lower
court level that the sanctioned taking of groundwater is limited to non-interfer-
ence with established riparian rights to stream water if the groundwater
pumping draws down the stream.12 However, there was no rationale established
by the court to show why one right should be superior to the other.
There appears to be one groundwater principle which is opposed to the
general application of the absolute rule 3 in Ohio. Although there is no
85 See CALLAHAN supra note 24, at 1. 86 Id.
87 122 Ohio St. 126, 170 N.E. 874 (1930).
88 49 Ohio St. 82, 30 N.E. 274 (1892).
s9 77 Ohio St. 643, 84 N.E. 1135 (1908).
90 12 Ohio St. 294, 30 N.E. 278 (1861).
91 107 Ohio St. 238, 140 N.E. 356 (1923).
92 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 855 (1855).
93 12 Ohio St. 294, 30 N.E. 278 (1861). The question of malicious intent is partially
covered in the discussion of Problem Case 1 infra, especially in the cases of Drinkwine
v. State, 300 A.2d 616 (Vt. 1973), and Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wisc. 355, 94 N.W. 354
(1903). See also 55 OHIo JuR. 2d Waters and Watercourses § 68 (1963) (noting point as
specifically left undecided in Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 [1861]); 56 Am. JUR.
Waters § 119 (1962) (concerning the aspect of waste); 93 C.J.S. Waters § 94 (1956)
(citing Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel, 163 Ind. 687, 72 N.E. 849 [1904];
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 [1855]; Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wisc. 355, 94 N.W. 354
[1903]).
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liability for taking groundwater from another's land through one's own, it
has been held a trespass to cause groundwater to seep onto adjacent land9"
to its detriment so as to materially affect the land's use and value. Presumably,
Miksch in essence overrules the holding implicit in the jury charge in Lewis,"'
where the law was interpreted to be that no liability arose unless the actual
excavation caused the damage.
Few of the various possible groundwater disputes have arisen to the
attention of the Ohio courts for at least two reasons. First, Ohio long has been
a relatively water-rich state. Secondly, the application of the absolute rule and
its more or less consistent extension by analogy to cases outside the original
fact pattern of Frazier probably has discouraged litigation. As water becomes
more scarce in some areas of the state, plaintiffs undoubtedly will try to argue
for the abandonment of the strict application of the absolute rule.96
GROUNDWATER PROBLEM CASES
The following section contains a discussion of the 28 identified physical
situations in which disputes may arise regarding the use of groundwater
and the resultant damage from the use or interference with groundwater.
Reviewing the cases, it is clear that the same physical situation, e.g.,
interference of one well with another, may be decided differently based
on a number of traditions with regard to the law of that jurisdiction. These
fall principally into several categories:
1. Precedent regarding the doctrine followed, i.e., whether the absolute
rule, reasonable use rule, appropriation rule or the correlative rights
rule prevails.
2. Precedent regarding use of water within the boundaries of these four
doctrines (or absence of them), e.g., precedents regarding malicious
or wasteful use of groundwater.
3. Precedents with regard to definitions of what is groundwater in various
circumstances. For example, precedents as to whether a spring is
groundwater, or the starting point of a surface stream may decide
the issue.
4. Rules of law not specifically related to groundwater or water rights in
general, e.g., in damage cases the law of torts or contracts may apply.
The approach here is to review the physical situations in the framework
of the Problem Cases, to note those situations where the issues have been
94 128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E. 387 (1934).
95 7 Ohio C. Dec. 566 (1878).
96 See MacArtor v. Graylyn Cress III Swim Club, 41 Del. Ch. 26, 187 A.2d 417 (1963);
Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1971), for examples of successful litigation
which argued for the abandonment of the absolute rule.
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litigated, the bases for the courts' reasoning and decision and to some extent
to develop a line of cases, where appropriate.
Problem Case I Interference with groundwater supply to a well by pumping
of another well."7
This is the simplest case and one which has been litigated in many
states, including Ohio. The situation illustrated shows a well tapping a
groundwater supply at a shallow level which is interfered with by the sinking
of a deeper well and heavier pumping. As a result the water table is lowered
by the development of a cone of depression to a lower level causing the loss of
supply of water to the first well.
Problem Case 1 has been considered by the courts many times. In one
of the earliest American cases, Greenleaf v. Francis,98 it was decided that the
owner of land may dig a well on any part of his land, notwithstanding that he
diminishes the water in his neighbor's well, unless he is motivated by a
malicious intent to deprive his neighbor of the water without benefit to
himself. The case is cited for the principle of the absolute rule.
An oft-cited case illustrating this situation is Huber v. Merkel.99 In
Huber, the plaintiff brought an action in equity to restrain the defendant from
wasting the water from artesian wells on the defendant's land on the grounds
that the use interfered with the flow of water from the plaintiff's well on his
land. Both were farmers, living within a half mile of one another in Wisconsin.
The defendant on lower ground had two artesian wells which he allowed to
flow continuously to their full capacity. He sold some of the water, used some
to supply a fishpond on his land and allowed the remainder to soak back into
the ground. The result of the full flow was that the water level in the plaintiff's
well dropped and he had to pump to obtain water for domestic and farm
purposes. Other neighbors in this small, 13-square-mile area of artesian
production, regulated their wells in a manner which benefited all.
Having first found that no subterranean stream existed, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin stated that it was clear that the appellant had a right,
resulting from ownership, to sink a well and use the water as he chose. The
plaintiff argued that statutory provisions of Wisconsin law provided that
artesian well owners must use due care and diligence to prevent any loss, or
waste or unreasonable use of water as to deprive or diminish flow in any
artesian well to the injury of another owner in the same vicinity. Thus,
plaintiff's argument was based on the premise that the Wisconsin statute
91 See Appendix B, fig. 5.
98 18 Pick. 117 (Mass. 1936).
99 117 Wise. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903).
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established the reasonable use rule.'00 The defendant and appellant argued that
the statute deprived him of property without due process of law, that it was a
taking of property without compensation and that it was special legislation. The
Wisconsin court found that the imposition of the reasonable use doctrine could
only be sustained if it was a proper exercise of police power. The court
could not comprehend how it could be applied in these circumstances since
"it does not even pretend to conserve any public interest."'' The court
even remarked that "upon its face its purpose is to promote the welfare of
one citizen by preventing his neighbor from using his own property."'0 2 The
court held that the statute's effect was that of taking private property for
private use and without compensation. It reversed the judgment (essentially
readopting the English rule) and remanded the case with directions to
dismiss. Huber is commonly cited for the proposition that even malicious
and wasteful use of groundwater is sanctioned, although it is arguable that
the court was addressing itself to other questions.' 3
The absolute rule has been sustained as recently as 1973, in Vermont,
where that state's highest court considered a Problem Case 1 situation. In
100 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A, at 153 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1973),
which points out that the American reasonable use rule embodies a special meaning of
the term "reasonable use." A waste of water or a wasteful use of water is not reasonable
only if it cause harm, and a use of water that causes harm is nevertheless reasonable if it
is made on or in connection with the overlying land. The withdrawal of water for
transportation and sale off the land, even for the most beneficial purposes, such as
municipal and domestic supply, is not reasonable in this special sense. Nevertheless, the
use of water is not restricted to the overlying land and large water users may transport
water from the land if no harm ensues. But see Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228
Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957) where the use of groundwater on the property for
watering chickens substantially affected adjacent property owner's well used for domestic
purposes.
101 117 Wisc. at 366, 367, 94 N.W. at 358 (1903).
102 Id.
103 Huber v. Merkely was specifically overruled by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
State v. Michels Pipeline Construction. Inc.. 63 Wisc. 2d 278. 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974),
which considered the interference by the City of Greenfield, Wisconsin, in the construc-
tion of a sewer line with groundwater supplies of private well owners. The water was
taken by pumping the city's wells at 5,500 gpm to dewater the ground to a depth of
40 feet to permit tunneling for the sewer causing a drop in the water table, drying up
of wells, hardening and cracking of foundations and driveways, which are all found as
elements of Problem Cases 1, 3 and 27. The issues before the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin were whether the pumping constituted a public nuisance, to which it answered
in the affirmative, and whether it constituted facts sufficient to form a cause of action.
The court restated at 63 Wisc. 2d at 288-89, 217 N.W.2d at 343, the holding in Huber tobe that "there is no cause of action for interference with ground water" and that mali-
cious intent did not affect the right to divert groundwater with impunity. In rejecting itsprevious decision in Huber, the court considered the English, reasonable use and
correlative rights doctrines, dismissing them in favor of the draft statement of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1973), which declares
that no liability for the beneficial use of groundwater results unless the withdrawal
causes unreasonable harm by lowering the water table.
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Drinkwine v. State,"' the Vermont court confirmed the rule even in a situation
where interference of two pumpers resulted from a state project and where in
similar instances other state courts have modified the rule. In Drinkwine, the
plaintiff had a spring or well on his land which provided water for domestic
and animal use. The state began a drilling program in 1969 to supply
groundwater for the Salsbury State Fish Hatchery, adjacent to the plaintiff's
land. The pumping by the state caused the plaintiff's well to go dry and he had
no other source of water. The plaintiff argued that the state of science
had progressed to such an extent that the flow of groundwater was predictable,
and that water had become scarce in Vermont to such an extent that it
warranted a change in the law. Yet, the court held that there are no correlative
rights in groundwater. It framed the issue as whether or not the court
should modify the absolute rule to the reasonable use rule in light of
environmental conditions. It cited Chatfield v. Wilson,' reaching back to 1855
for precedent supporting the absolute rule, and further stated that the plaintiff
had not carried the burden of proof that water was so scarce in Vermont as to
warrant a change in the law. It is important to note the reasoning in Chatfield
was very similar to that in Frazier, i.e., that groundwater is by nature "secret,
changeable and uncontrollable." Thus, in spite of the proven engineering
and geological capability of the State of Vermont to find and produce a
source of water, the court relied on the "myth of ignorance" to justify its
position and did so in spite of the fact that the state was taking the Drinkwines'
only source of water for a public purpose."0
In other jurisdictions where the absolute rule has prevailed, courts have
recognized that the absolute right to appropriate groundwater is not a right at
all when the small, private landowner is faced with the prospect of competing
with a commercial user or with the government. As early as 1900, a New York
court faced with the problem of governmental interference with private water
supplies and the question of knowledge of groundwater source and movement,
held for the plaintiff whose wells were threatened. °7 The plaintiff, Forbell,
operated a farm in Queens, Long Island, New York. The City of New York
purchased 12 acres, installed wells and a pumping plant fully aware of the
operation and habits of the water in its own and adjacent land. Thus, the city
was fully cognizant of the fact that to capture the greater part of this
104 131 Vt. 127, 300 A.2d 616 (Vt. 1973).
105 28 Vt. 49 (1855).
10 Compared with the now rejected holding in Huber, the Vermont court's decision is
biting and highlights the disparity in strength of the state with its technological and legal
capacity to defeat a private groundwater producer under the "law of the biggest pump."
Apparently the absolute rule doctrine can defeat the constitutional prohibition against
taking without compensation.
107 Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522 58 N.E. 644 (1900).
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water would result in a lowering of the underground water to such an
extent that the owners would have been unable to grow crops.
The court awarded Forbell $6,000 damages. It found that this was not a
case where the groundwater was unobservable from the surface or so unknown
as to be speculative. To the contrary, before the City of New York constructed
the well, "it ascertained to a business certainty that they could obtain water." 10
The court's reasons for finding the city liable are pertinent to the
reasoning in Frazier. In essence, the court followed the reasoning in Frazier,
that is, if the presence and movement of groundwater is indeed secret, occult
and unknown, then the interferor may not be liable, but that was not the case
here." 9 The court reasoned that the absolute rule was unjust, and said that
"it does wrong the letter of the law in defiance of its spirit." Further, it
recognized that the water supply of a great city is more important than
the use made by Forbell for growing celery and water cress, but that the
city can exercise its rights of eminent domain and provide its residents water
without injustice to Forbell.
An important consideration of Problem Case 1 came about in a Missouri
case in 1971,110 which emphasized the magnitude of the situation we face
today compared with the time of Judge Brinkerhoff's decision in Frazier.
Because of the importance of the case's clear exposition of the facts and
reasoning, it will be reviewed at some length. The plaintiff and appellant,
Higday, owned 6,000 acres in the McBaine Bottom in Boone County, central
Missouri, near Huntdale along the north side of the Missouri River. Underlying
his land was "porous rock, gravel, and soil." Water infiltrating through this
sediment came from the adjacent Missouri River and was trapped in the river
basin fill underneath by limestone which prevented significant downward
infiltration from the valley fill, so that a huge moving body of water existed in
the subsurface of the river plain on which the plaintiff lived and farmed.
The respondent, City of Columbia, with 50,000 inhabitants, had been
seeking an adequate source of water since 1948 to replenish its dwindling
supply. Following the advice of consulting engineers, it settled on a plan of
extraction by shallow wells from the supply underlying the river plain and
planned to transport the water 12 miles to the city for sale. The citizens had
approved bond issues for the development of the water supply in the McBaine
Bottom. Further scientific analysis and measurement of the water resources
followed. With the aid of a test well, it was determined that the water
table when undisturbed, rose to an average of 10 feet below the ground
10 8 Id. at 524, 58 N.E. at 645.
109 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1973).
110 Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1971).
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surface. The water moved at a rate of two feet per day, displacing 10.5
million gallons of water daily past a given line.
The city, by threat of condemnation, acquired from some of the appellants
five well sites on about 17 acres. The city then threatened to take groundwater
at the rate of 11.5 million gallons per day, that is, to mine the groundwater, and
to do so for purposes unrelated to any beneficial use of the overlying land. This
mining of the groundwater at the overdraft rate of one million gallons per
day (mgd) would reduce the water table in the area from about a depth of
10 feet to a new subsurface depth of about 20 feet. The appellants complained
that the reduction would divert groundwater normally available for their
crops, livestock and personal use and would eventually turn their land
into an arid and sterile surface. That portion of Missouri required intensive
irrigation for farming.
On the basis of the above allegations, the plaintiffs sought a judicial
declaration that the city was without any right to extract the groundwater for
sale or any other use not related to the beneficial ownership or enjoyment
of the overlying land. They claimed that lacking that declaration, the city
would deprive them of the reasonable use of the groundwater under their
lands. They therefore requested an injunction.
The facts showed that the city's plan to exploit the McBaine Bottom had
advanced to the point where well sites had been obtained. The city had
committed almost 5 million dollars to the project and had sites for wells and a
water treatment plant and the laying of pipe was almost complete. Once the
wells were in, the city claimed it had the right to withdraw groundwater
in any amount it desired.
The city's position was that they have no obligation to the appellants.
The city claimed the appellants had no legal right which was subject to
infringement by them, thus, there was no controversy and no declaratory relief
could be rendered. The city stated that since 1895 Missouri had recognized
the ccmrnon law rule that a landowner has absolute ownership to the waters
under his land and thus may withdraw any quantity of water for any purpose,
even if the result is to deprive the plaintiff of water. Such use by the city, it
claims, is damnum absque injuria and not actionable.
The court reviewed the definitions of underground streams, the absolute
rule and reasonable use rule and concluded that the principal difficulty in the
application of the reasonable use rule is in determining what constitutes a
reasonable use. Then citing cases from eastern and western states, it said:
However, the modern decisions agree that under the rule of reasonable
use, an overlying owner, including a municipality may not withdraw
percolating water and transport it for sale or other use away from the
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land from which it was taken if the result is to impair the supply of an
adjoining landowner to his injury. Such a use is unreasonable because
non-beneficial and "is not for a lawful purpose within the general rule
concerning percolating waters, but constitutes an actionable wrong for
which damages are recoverable .... 111
The city, of course, contended that the absolute rule prevailed in Missouri
both by judicial decision and by statute, but the court reviewed judicial and
legislative history and decided that it was not until 1860 that it was decided:
"that, without liability to an adjoining owner, an overlying owner might exhaust
the groundwater to furnish a municipal water supply.""' 2 It found that there
was no law of any kind on the subject at the time the common law was adopted
by statute in Missouri. It further decided, unlike the Vermont court in
Drinkwine, that the subsequent English decisions on percolating waters were
not more binding on them than the decisions of any court of another state
and that: "[t] here is no impediment of inherited doctrine to our determination
of the question presented according to the justice of the case." "I
The court held for the plaintiff (appellant) reversing the trial court and
remanding the case for further proceedings. It declared that the rules which
govern the use of groundwater in Missouri "are the same which apply to
surface water" (perhaps a poor choice of words) that is, the reasonable use
rule. Under this rule, it found:
... the fundamental measure of the overlying owner's right to use the
groundwater is whether it is for.. . beneficial enjoyment of the land
from which it was taken. Thus, a private owner may not withdraw
groundwater for purposes of sale if the adjoining landowner is thereby
deprived of water necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of his land."'
The court further stated:
Here the municipality has acquired miniscule plots of earth and by use
of powerful pumps intends to draw into wells on its own land for
merchandising, groundwater stored in plaintiff's land, thereby depriving
'Id. at 866, citing Bristor v. Cheatham. 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173 (1953) (Arizona is
one of the driest appropriation states); Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 196 Mich.
75, 163 N.W. 109 (1917); Meeker v. East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 75 A. 379 (1909);
Forbell v. City of New York, 47 App. Div. 371, 61 N.Y.S. 1005 (1900); Canada v.
Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1937). Each of the latter cases represents
reasonable use jurisdictions. The Meeker court changed from the absolute rule to the
reasonable use rule in a Problem Case 18 situation thus preventing the use by the city of
the water from the well property without paying damages.
112 469 S.W.2d at 867.
11 Id. Cf. State v. Michels Pipeline Construction, Inc., 63 Wisc. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339
(1974) for extended analysis of stare decisis as applied to groundwater doctrines.
114 469 S.W.2d at 868.
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plaintiffs of the beneficial use of the normal water table to their
immediate injury and to the eventual impoverishment of their lands.' 1 '
Then citing Shenk v. Ann Arbor1 6 and Canada v. Shawnee,"' the court
explained its interpretation of the reasonable use rule as requiring the
defendant to withdraw the groundwater so as not to interfere with the plaintiff's
beneficial use of such water."' Application of the same rule to groundwater
as used for streams provides a legal standard by which water resources may be
allocated equitably and beneficially among competing users. The court also
noted that the application of such a legal standard would give recognition to
the established interrelationship between surface and groundwater and would
bring into one legal classification most waters over which there might arise
some controversy-perhaps a bold hope. At least, the court recognized the
physical facts. The Missouri court goes further than the New York court did
in Forbell in rejecting the absolute rule, but does so for similar reasons.
Facing the knowledge issue squarely in relating its rationale for its decision,
the court stated that since:
The science of groundwater hydrology has come into existence, it has
proven the postulates of the common law rule to be unsound. The premise
that the owner of the soil owns all that lies beneath the surface so that he
may use the percolating water in any way he chooses without liability
to an adjoining owner fails to recognize that the supply of groundwater is
limited, and that the first inherent limitation on water right is the
availability of the supply.
Modem knowledge and techniques have discredited this premise also.
The movement, supply, rate of evaporation and many other physical
characteristics of groundwater are now readily determinable .... At the
time the City acquired the well and water treatment sites, it had full
knowledge of the dimensions of the underlying aquifer, the volume of
groundwater it contained, the daily rate of recharge, the direction and
rate of flow, the normal water level and, at the rate of capture
contemplated by the City, the level to which the groundwater would be
lowered. The City cannot be permitted to escape liability by appeals to a
doctrine which assumes that the very information the City has acted upon
was not available to it. (emphasis added)"'
115 Id. at 870, citing Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 Pac. 766 (1902). See gener-
ally 59 AM. JuR. Waters § 118 (1962); Annot., 31 A.L.R. 908 (1924), for the proposi-
tion that the transportation of water away from producing land for the purpose of
commercial use is injury to overlying groundwater basin owners.
116 196 Mich. 75, 163 N.W. 109 (1917).
117 197 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1937).
I's 469 S.W.2d at 870. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A at 153 (Tent.
Draft No. 17, 1973).
119 469 S.W.2d at 870.
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Thus, the Missouri court rejected the absolute rule, 2 ' partially for the
same reasons that Judge Brinkerhoff adopted it in Frazier.
Next for consideration is the situation of two interfering pumpers which
are both privately owned, a situation analogous to that presented in Frazier,
but in a more modern setting. In 1963 in Delaware, the Court of Chancery
was presented with the case of MacArtor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club."'
The plaintiff, MacArtor, lived in a suburban area and had a well for domestic
use which was only four feet deep. The defendant swim club, on leased property
across the road, built a pool about 150 feet from the plaintiffs house.'
The swim club needed 240,000 gallons to fill its pool, but once filled did
not require massive amounts of water throughout the year. When the swim
club pumped, the MacArtor well went dry. The court found that the MacArtor
well was objectively marginal for domestic use while the defendant's well,
though substantial, used more than a normal household. It considered the
problem of balance of interests, finding equity on both sides. It applied the test
of "objective reasonableness" to the allocation of rights in groundwater and
decided a number of issues regarding what constituted reasonable use as
between two private owners, viz:
1. That the court may consider the intention of the injurer.
2. That recreational use of groundwater is a reasonable use.
3. That the plaintiff is not entitled to have the use of the deep well enjoined
merely because the defendant could purchase water commercially at
reasonable rates.
4. That prior use of groundwater does not automatically preempt other
use, i.e., the court rejected the appropriation doctrine.
5. That the comparative number of users of water produced may be a
relevant factor in the consideration of what is reasonable use.
6. That as a general rule, a landowner may make reasonable use of
groundwater.
It imposed a seldom used solution to the problem, ordering the plaintiff
either to deepen his well with costs to be split between the plaintiff and the
defendant, or to connect to the commercial supplier, the Suburban Water
Company. If the plaintiff chose to deepen his well, the court ordered that he
120 But see Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957) (for
similar results between private owners with a strong dissent).
12141 Del. Ch. 26, 187 A.2d 417 (1963).
122 The defendant sunk a well 200 feet deep which incidentally penetrated solid rock at
42 feet and was cased in steel to the surface from that depth. Testimony from ground-
water geologists on both sides confirmed that both wells tapped the same source of
groundwater in spite of the difference in depths.
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must bear the risk of deepening it, that is if no water is produced, it would
be his loss. In addition, it ordered the defendant to pay for the water to be
supplied the plaintiff in the interim. 2 '
Compared with the decision of the Vermont court in Drinkwine, the
decision of the Delaware court has much to recommend it in terms of actually
solving the problem of competitive groundwater supply use. In making the
decision, the court adopted a reasonable use rule, apparently without anguish,
stating simply that:
The doctrine of "reasonable user" commends itself here. This rule permits
the court to consider and evaluate the various factors on both sides and
arrive at an "accomodation" of the conflicting rights, if that is feasible. It
also permits the court to consider the intentions of the offending party
and his actions subsequent to the discovery of the consequences of
his use of the water.
1 2
4
Thus, it appears the court was willing to accept the responsibility of
making a decision in spite of the fact that there was no prior knowledge of the
effect of the establishment of the new well, as there was in Higday. It did not
resort to the "easy out" of declaring the subject matter too mysterious to
consider, nor did it simply say that there was no liability for such damage.'
Similar problems of interference have occurred in Ohio in recent years
where the "rule of the biggest pump" has caused unresolved conflict and
damage. Since 1970 industrial pumpers in and about Van Wert, Ohio, have
drastically lowered the water table forcing residents to lower their pumps or
drill new wells."' Investigation showed that in the Van Wert area there are two
shallow rock units, the unconsolidated glacial deposits of clay, sand and gravel
and the bedrock formations of limestone and dolomite. The glacial deposits
cover the entire area and range in thickness from 15 to 145 feet. These
deposits are considered a poor source of water, capable of yielding meager
domestic supplies locally. The water capacity of the limestone bedrock varies,
but generally is a good source. The majority of domestic wells yield adequate
123 The result would be entirely different through the use of the interpretation of the
reasonable use rule as stated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A, at 154
(Tent. Draft No. 17, 1973).
24 41 Del. Ch. at 27, 187 A.2d at 419.
125 In Iowa, which has a permit system, similar solutions to groundwater supply problems
are reached through administratively encouraged compromise.
126 H. EAGON, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, GROUND-WATER LEVELS IN THE VICINITY OF
VAN WERT, VAN WERT COUNTY, OHIO (1973). The situation sparked alarm. There had
been increased groundwater usage by industry in Van Wert and it was feared that
continued unrestrained withdrawals from the limestone aquifer would result in depletion
and hardship to area residents. An investigation was requested in 1972 by the Division
of Water of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources with the support of Congressman
Latta, the Director of the Ohio Department of Health and the Ohio EPA.
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water at depths between 80 and 150 feet. Wells yielding 100 to 300 gpm can
be developed by drilling the full thickness of the limestone, about 400 feet.
Below that there is an unproductive shale aquiclude. In the limestone, the
water moves through complex systems of joints, fractures and channels at a
rate of a few feet per day and generally from the southwest to the northeast, as
is shown by the gradient of the water table elevation. -1 27 The main source
of recharge is from regional flow and precipitation which seeps through the
glacial materials into the limestone aquifer.
The geologic study dealt with two main questions: (1) did new and
increased pumping by industry cause the lowering of the water level in the
Van Wert area?; and, (2) would the water levels continue to decline? Because
domestic and small commercial pumping generally affected the levels so little
this might go unnoticed. However, municipal and industrial pumping centers
developed strong draw-down,12 the shape of the cone depending on the location
and intensity of pumping centers. It was possible to reconstruct the water level
for the period before the heavy industrial pumpers began. It was estimated thai
pumping by industries averaged between 600 and 700 thousand gallons per
day during the 13-year period before 1972. By 1972 the conditions had
affected a substantial section of the Van Wert area.' The cone of influence
affected an area of about 18 square miles, and the withdrawal was up to
about one million gallons per day or about three acre feet per day. The
significant decline between 1968 and 1972 can be seen' in the northwest
portion of Van Wert where groundwater levels declined as much as 40 feet.
A lowering of as much as 10 feet encompassed an area of about four
square miles. The investigation predicted further reductions during the next
extended period of deficient precipitation."'
As a result, some citizens of Ohio were faced with serious problems of
depletion of their water supply or redevelopment at excessive cost in the
Van Wert area to the benefit of others. If the City of Van Wert were still
127 See Appendix B, fig. 6.
128 See Appendix B, fig. 7.
129 See Appendix B, figs. 6, 7.
180 See Appendix B, fig. 8.
231 As a result of the study, two serious problems were indicated. First, many of the
industrial wells penetrate the thickness of the limestone aquifer where pumping is
believed to range between the 90- and 250-foot-depth levels. In limestone aquifers, water
generally enters through a few discrete zones rather than uniformly through the entire
footage of the borehole. The discrete zones will define a critical pumping level, which if
exceeded, will result in excessive drawdown and loss of well capacity. Lowering the conejust a few feet could cause great reduction in yield. Secondly, in the case of shallow
wells, several individuals already had to lower pumps, deepen wells or drill new wells.
Some well systems have been rendered inadequate; others will experience difficulties as
the region develops. Thus the small water user finds himself in conflict with large users
and although water is available at depth, it becomes more costly to obtain.
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relying on a groundwater supply, there could be a general crisis affecting
the health and welfare of a substantial portion of the city's population.
Applying the absolute rule, there is no recourse. Yet following the reasoning
of the courts in Forbell and Higday, and from a general knowledge of business
practices, it is more than reasonable to assume that the industrial pumpers
knew, or should have known, what water supply was available before they
invested large sums of money in exploiting it. Drilling costs average 10 to 20
dollars per foot. Furthermore, they knew or should have known that their large
demands would draw down the water table to the injury of neighboring
shallow wells. Thus, the reasoning of Judge Brinkerhoff in 1861, is inadequate
when applied to the situation in Van Wert. Rather, a thorough up-to-date
analysis should find that the extent and availability of the water supply in
Van Wert is amenable to determination by applicable scientific and
engineering principles; that the promotion of the general welfare requires that
a limited water supply be shared in some reasonable manner; and, that in order
to protect the established interests and needs of the citizens of Van Wert,
another doctrine-reasonable use, correlative rights, appropriation or even the
Restatement of Torts approach-should be applied in Ohio.
Problem Case 2 Interference with a flowing spring fed by a groundwater
supply by pumping of a well.
32
A groundwater-fed spring is reduced or cut off by the lowering of
the groundwater table as the result of establishment and pumping of a
new well. This was the physical situation which led to the landmark Ohio
Supreme Court decision in Frazier which established the absolute rule as
the basic doctrine of common law on groundwater in Ohio.
In many court cases it is difficult to distinguish between a natural spring
and one which has been improved into a water supply as a dug well. Physically,
a spring is the intersection of the groundwater table with the surface of the
land where water issues at some discrete point."3 As noted previously, Frazier
is a Problem Case 2 as is Logan Gas and Drinkwine, depending on how one
reads the facts. One of the older, often cited cases within this problem area is
Chatfield v. Wilson,"' in the State of Vermont, where the court found that
groundwater was too secret and changeable to be regulated by law. Basically,
Problem Case 2 situations are not much different from Case 1 situations unless
there is a problem of definition. The problems of definition can occur in two
ways. On the one hand, one of the disputants may claim that the well is fed by
132 See Appendix B, fig. 9.
133 Seepage into streams from the groundwater, a similar physical situation, is not one
usually described as a spring, at least not in the legal literature. As a result, some cases
appear to consider situations described as interference with a spring; others as interference
with a well or use both terms in the same case for the same source of water.
13428 Vt. 49 (1855).
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an underground stream, in which case the law applied is different in an absolute
doctrine jurisdiction. On the other hand, the court may consider the spring
to be part of a stream, if it in fact begins a stream, and hence it will be subject
to riparian laws rather than those applied to groundwater. All of this makes
little sense from a hydrologic standpoint and is simply grist for the legal mill.
Problem Case 3 Interference with groundwater supply by surface excavation
below the water table (quarry, strip mine, etc.). 3 '
The original water table at a high level is lowered by the excavation to a
lower level where springs develop at the interface of the excavation (road cut)
and the water flows out into the cut. This is analogous to the situation in
Elster,"6 except that the ditching there was for a sewer project and the ditch
was later filled in. The situation occurs frequently and has been litigated
many times, especially in situations where the excavation has affected domestic
water supplies. As in Problem Case 1, a number of approaches have been
used by courts to resolve the dispute. 3 '
In Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co.,"1 the Supreme Court of North Carolina
considered a situation where a quarry operation interfered with the plaintiff's
groundwater supply. The court felt it could not extend liability in a reasonable
use jurisdiction. In Nello, which might be considered a Problem Case 16
situation or even a pollution problem, the defendant's open pit quarrying went
below the water table. Pumps were installed to dewater the quarry and as a
result the water in the plaintiff's well became salty and unusable. The court
found that all the evidence showed that the defendant was mining in
accordance with the best practices and pumped no more groundwater than
was necessary for the operation in a useful and beneficial way, and hence was
not wasting any.139 Since there was no evidence of waste or of intentional
contamination or interference with the plaintiff's supply of groundwater, nor
evidence of malice or negligence, the court found that the defendant's motion
for judgment of involuntary nonsuit made at the close of all evidence in the
trial court was improperly overruled. The court did not feel that the defendant
was required to let its rock quarry remain unworked because of groundwater
135 See Appendix B, fig. 10.
136 49 Ohio St. 82, 30 N.E. 274 (1892).
187 Id.
138 188 N.C. 1, 123 S.E. 482 (1924). See also Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1203 (1925).
139 Contra, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 858A, at 159 (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1973), explaining the meanings of reasonable and unreasonable use: "Very serious harm
can occur where salt water intrudes into fresh water aquifers.... Usually these effects
result from combined withdrawals of many persons, but they may be caused by a single
large operation. In latter cases, the harm caused to groundwater users whose withdrawals
do not materially contribute to the salt water intrusion is unreasonable." However good
legal reasoning may be, the statement may not be a significant one hydrologically.
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inflow in order to protect the underground water supply of the plaintiff.' °
When the State of Vermont was constructing a highway and interfering
with a water supply the Vermont court saw the situation differently. In
Winooski v. State Highway Board,'" ' the Vermont State Highway Department,
exercising eminent domain, took 3.4 acres of plaintiff's 49 acres for highway
construction. After construction began, Winooski lost a well field west of the
condemned parcel and the wells failed to produce. The lower court dismissed
the case. However, the Supreme Court of Vermont, in an absolute rule
jurisdiction, said that "[i]f substantial evidence brought forth to satisfy the
triers of fact that the loss of a property right was caused by the taking of land
for highway purposes, the consequential damage is recoverable..." 142 in spite of
the more general rule that percolating water is found to be "secret, changeable
and uncontrollable" as set forth in Chatfield, the leading Vermont precedent.
The outcome is interesting, because in an absolute rule jurisdiction where
water rights are property rights, the injured party gets compensation," 3 while
in a reasonable use rule jurisdiction there is generally no recognition of
damage because the property owner is using the land reasonably. The factor
of a state taking is probably significant, i.e., as between two private owners, it
is unlikely that the outcome would be the same.
140 Contra, Parker v. Boston & Maine R.R., 3 Cush. 107 (1849) where the railroad,
involved in construction excavations for its roadbed, interfered with plaintiff's spring.
The court found that the railroad, although armed with eminent domain, was answerable
to the owner of the spring it destroyed on the ground that the "destruction of the spring
was not required for the purposes of the owner of the land through which the excavation
was made." At the same time, the court fully recognized that each landowner had the
right to make proper use of this land and that sinking a well is a proper use resulting in
no liability. Interestingly, the court ignored the knowledge question applying a rather
strict liability to the railroad once it had determined that there was no need by the
landowner for this activity. See also BEUSCHER supra note 6, at 35. But see Rouse v.
Kingston, 188 N.C.1, 123 S.E. 482 (1924), distinguished by the Nello court, where the
City of Kingston had dug artesian wells and conveyed groundwater to the city for sale to
its inhabitants for domestic use and fire protection. Clearly, the North Carolina court is
not looking at the interference in terms of the physical situation but instead is looking
at the subsequent use of the produced water. See also Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1203 (1925).
In California, where under the correlative rights doctrine, the Alameda County
Water District obtained an injunction against Niles Sand and Gravel Company to prevent
the defendant from pumping water from gravel pits where this was a detriment to the
specified water basin and a detriment to the restorative program of the county as trustee
for all the surface owners in the basin. Alameda County Water Dist. v. Niles Sand &
Gravel Co., Inc., 37 Cal. App. 3d 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1974).
141 124 Vt. 496, 207 A.2d 255 (1965).
142 Id. at 500-01, 207 A.2d at 259.
143 Damages are paid for loss of groundwater where the public agency has taken some
part of the land of the person who has lost his groundwater supply. These consequential
damages are paid as the required compensation for the taking of the land. Tennessee Gas
Transmission Co. v. Wolfe, 159 Ohio St. 391, 122 N.E. 376 (1953). But not under the
rule in Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861), if the land is not actually taken.
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More recently in the case of Labruzzo v. Atlantic Dredging and Const.
Co.,1" the Florida court approached the question of liability as a case governed
by the law of torts solely, and not one of groundwater law. In Labruzzo, the
complaint alleged that the construction company, by negligently dredging a
yacht basin, had permanently diverted and destroyed a spring and diverted
an underground stream from its natural channel. The existence of the
underground stream was stipulated! The lower court agreed that the complaint
stated a cause of action for intentional invasion of water rights, but the
Supreme Court of Florida reversed the decision finding that, in the absence
of surface indication, an interference with subterranean water is unintentional
and damage is without injury unless the conduct is the result of negligence or
reckless or ultrahazardous activity. Nonetheless, the court held that "[p]roperty
rights to... waters that naturally percolate are correlative, each landowner is
restricted to a reasonable use of his property.""14 The question in Labruzzo
turned on knowledge. If the contractor had no knowledge of the possibility
or probability of his interfering with the plaintiff's water, then he had no
duty to take precautions. If he did know, and the foreseeable result of the
dredging would be to interrupt the underground stream, then he had a
duty. The mere general knowledge of the subsurface conditions would not
suffice and the court spoke squarely to that point when it found:
A complaint alleging that waters which formed a spring on the plaintiff's
land flowed in an underground stream under defendants adjacent land,
and that defendant knew or should have known that the area was
underlain by limestone strata which was commonly pierced with water
courses, and that defendant negligently excavated on its property and
thereby interrupted. .. the natural flow ... was insufficient to state a
cause of action.'
The court did not find that the excavations were ultrahazardous or that the
defendant had acted recklessly.
The question of knowledge is even more difficult when dealing with
excavations which interfere with groundwater supplies than the situation
where two wells are interfering. Simply, this is due to the fact that the
excavator's activity may be totally unrelated to any consideration of water
supplies and he indeed may be as surprised to find substantial water in his
excavation as the owner of the well or spring is surprised to find his well has
gone dry. Also the resultant expense to each may be substantial.
Both case and statutory law have placed a burden on the strip miner who
interferes with a water supply or who damages it with polluting substances.
14454 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1951).
15Id.
146 Id.
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Ohio Revised Code Section 1513.15 creates a legal remedy for interference
with a legitimate use of groundwater by a strip mine operator. "7 Pennsylvania
case law is similar, but rests upon another basis. In Bumbarger v. Walker,"'
the court held that the ruination of a spring fed by groundwater as the result
of blasting in a strip mine 2,250 feet away and about 100 feet higher, such
that the level of the water was affected and the water became polluted with
high sulfur content and unfit for use, made the defendant liable. In spite of the
general rule recognized by the court that an interferor is not liable for
disturbing groundwater by mining, the general verdict for the plaintiff was
sustained on the basis that the blasting was an ultrahazardous activity. The
dissent objected that this constituted an unwarranted extension of the doctrine
of tort liability; was contrary to the established law on liability for interference
with groundwater; was unforeseeable and hence the defendant was not
negligent; and, that the plaintiff did not establish concussion damage-"'
The Problem Case 3 situation occurs relatively frequently in Ohio. The
Department of Natural Resources, Division of Geological Survey, has
undertaken numerous studies which involve this type of interference, especially
in the situations of gravel pit operations, which naturally lowers the
groundwater table, or instances where there is pumping.' In addition,
the Ohio Department of Highways receives numerous complaints from
landowners along the route of new highway construction that their domestic
147 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1513.15(c) (Page 1974) reads in pertinent part:
An owner of real property who obtains all or part of his supply for domestic,
industrial, agricultural or other legitimate use from an underground source other
than a subterranean stream having a permanent, distinct and known channel, may
maintain an action against an operator to recover damages for contamination,
diminution or interruption of such water supply, proximately resulting from strip
mining.
148 193 Pa. Super. 301, 164 A.2d 145 (1960).
14 9 But see Western Geophysical Co. of America v. Mason, 402 S.W.2d 657 (Ark..
1966), where defendant company was held strictly liable for damages to a water well
from explosions used for geophysical prospecting; no showing of negligence necessary.
See also O'Brien v. Primm, 243 Ark. 186, 419 S.W.2d 323 (1967) defendant company
held liable for damage to a water well 550 feet from the oil well and 2,000 feet above it
as a result of a "sand frac" and acidizing treatment, in spite of expert testimony that the
casing was intact and the cement would prevent contamination of the water well. The
"frac job" physically lifts the subsurface strata and expands natural fractures. This result
notwithstanding the general rule that oil well operations are per se a nuisance. See, e.g.,
Cline v. Kirkbride, 12 Ohio C.D. 517 (1901); Fairfax Oil Co. v. Bolinger, 186 Okla.
20, 97 P.2d 574 (1939). But more in line with the rule that while there is a legal right to
carry on drilling operations, no one has the right to produce substantial physical damage
through vibrations, British-American Oil Producing Co. v. McClain, 191 Okla. 40, 126
P.2d 530 (1942).
1 5 0 H. EAGON, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, GROUND-WATER LEVELS IN THE FOREST HILLS
AREA NEAR SPRINGFIELD, CLARK COUNTY (1972); H. EAGON, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION,
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED GRAVEL PIT OPERATION ON GROUND WATER, SECTION
20 SALEM TOWNSHIP, SHELBY COUNTY (1972).
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wells have gone dry."' Investigation of these complaints by the Geological
Survey has substantiated a number of them. The informal policy of the
Department of Highways has been to compensate some landowners, drill
new wells in singular cases, or ignore the complaint, depending on the
recommendations of the division engineer, the amount of adverse publicity
attendant, and whether there was additional property to be acquired for the
right of way in the area. The Highway Department customarily makes no
survey before construction begins which potentially could cause water supply
interference problems, nor does it check the level of wells near the proposed
road so that it can have a baseline of preconstruction information. 5 '
Problem Case 4 Interference with groundwater supply by reducing pressure
in the storage reservoir; same supply present." 3
In this situation a water well, tapping a confined aquifer, receives
reduced flow after construction of a gas storage reservoir in the same confined
aquifer. As illustrated, the confined aquifer is fed from surface infiltration
and lake seepage. After the gas storage facility is established in the pores
of the sandstone reservoir, the pressure of the gas interferes with the free
downward flow of the groundwater towards the water well.
The specific situation apparently has not yet been litigated. However,
situations which resemble it have been touched on by the courts. In Erickson
v. Crookston Waterworks Power & Light Co., 5 general principles were
established which could be applied to this type of groundwater problem. In
Erickson, which actually is a Problem Case 1 situation, one of the questions
addressed by the Minnesota court was the maintenance of water levels in the
plaintiff's well. The court found that the maintenance of the water level was
proper. However reasonable this may be legally, water level maintenance is
physically impractical, if not impossible in many instances, and contrary
to the concept of the use of the water. 5 ' "Safe yield" is a separate matter.
151 A. WALKER, HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION, NEW AND SUNFISH TOWNSHIPS, PIKE COUNTY
(1973).
152 OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMM'N, "DE-WATERING" BY PUBLIC AGENCIES, Report
No. 3, at 5 (1974), states:
... the Department's policy during at least the past 10 years has been simply to
evaluate each complaint of water loss, and to pay damages if the Department finds
that the highway project caused the loss-making no point to distinguish whether
there has been a "taking" or not under the principles of eminent domain law. The
Department has no formal complaint procedure, and there is no appeal from the
Department's decision, other than to fie an action in mandamus or injunction, or
to file a claim with the Sundry Claims Board [now Court of Claims].
153 See Appendix B, fig. 11.
15 105 Minn. 182, 117 N.W. 435 (1908).
155 See, supra note 6. Contra, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A (Tent. Draft
No. 17, 1973): "A possessor of land.., who withdraws groundwater.., is not subject
to liability.., unless: (a) The withdrawal of water causes unreasonable harm through
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A principal case close to the problem is Current Creek Irrigation Co. v.
Andrews,1" in which the central questions were (1) whether a prior appropri-
ator of water from an underground basin who received it by means of flowing
wells and springs had a vested right to continue to receive the water by artesian
pressure; and, (2) whether subsequent appropriators, whose withdrawals of
water lowered the water table and reduced the flow must restore the pressure
or bear the expense of replacing the water of prior appropriators. While it was
held that this is a right of the prior appropriator and provides an economic
solution, it does not necessarily imply a satisfactory technological one.
Thus, while neither case directly speaks to the Problem Case 4 under
discussion, a helpful analogy may be extended.
Problem Case 5 Interference with groundwater supply by pumping from
mines. 15
The situation envisioned is one in which groundwater floods or interferes
with a mining operation to the extent that it is necessary to pump the mine.
This is a common natural occurrence and pumping is often a necessity. The
case illustrated shows a coal mine with an original groundwater table in a
sandstone formation. Extraction of the coal proceeds until a point is reached
where the shaft encounters the overlying sandstone which has cut down into
the coal lower than elsewhere in the mine as part of the depositional history
of the sandstone. The transmissibility of the sandstone is greater than that of
clay and limestone, normally overlying the coal, and the water pours into
the mine. The subsequent pumping to clear the mine lowers the water table
faster and causes the water well to fail.
It is not clear from the reports about the case that Acton v. Blundell15 .
was concerned exactly with a Problem Case 5 situation, inasmuch as it could
be a Problem Case 6. Nevertheless, it is close enough to warrant comment
here because Acton, heard in 1843, is the English court case which set the
absolute rule by holding that the defendant has a right to sink coal pits
on his own land, although he thereby drained a well on the plaintiffs land.
The decision is closer to the Problem Case 3 situations of excavations
lowering the water table or reducing artesian pressure"; and comment to § 858A, Clause
(a) at 157: "There is usually enough water for all users, and the problem is one of
drilling a new deep well, installing a pump, paying increased pumping costs, or obtaining
water from an alternate source." The "improvement" of the law in the Restatement
Tentative Draft does not seem to allocate risk in a fashion any less arbitrary than the law
of capture and points up the fact that groundwater supply management requires
knowledge and controls.
1 5 6 9 Utah 2d 324, 344 P.2d 258 (1959).
151 See Appendix B, fig. 12.
158 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843), which was relied upon by the Frazier court as establish-
ing the absolute rule.
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interfering with water supplies than those of Case 1, interference of two
pumpers for which it is cited as support in so many cases.
The famous early American case comes not surprisingly from Pennsyl-
vania. In Wheatley v. Baugh,"5 9 the plaintiff (defendant in error), a tanner,
maintained a spring of water, from which he obtained supplies to use in tanning
hides. In 1852, a valuable copper mine was discovered on the adjacent farm.
Defendant sunk a shaft and installed pumps to remove the water which
interfered with the mining operations. Later, larger pumps were put in and in
about two weeks Baugh's spring ceased to flow. When the pumps were stopped
for a short period, the spring began to flow again. The distance from the
spring to mine's mouth was 550 yards and uphill 50 feet. The issue before
the court was one of proper damages. The court reviewed the absolute rule
and its relation to property under a discussion of the maxim "cuJus est solum
." and the reasonable use rule under the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas." It then discussed and cited Roman law and European civil codes
and earlier American and English cases, concluding that there was no evidence
showing "that the mining company had been guilty of anything beyond the
proper use of their own property. The plaintiff below [downhill] had therefore
no cause of action, and the jury ought to have been so instructed.""'
Judge Lewis gave two interesting reasons for his opinion which sound
familiar. His first reason was that, in conducting extensive mining operations,
it is, in general, impossible to preserve the flow of groundwater through the
pores of the rock and many springs must of necessity be destroyed. While his
grasp of the hydrologic situation is probably correct, it is not so clear why poor
Baugh had to give up his water and perhaps his tanning business so that
Wheatley could mine copper. What is clear is that Baugh suffered economic
loss to Wheatley's benefit.
His second reason was, that in his estimation, the public interest was
greatly promoted by protecting what he called the "perfect right" as opposed to
an "imperfect right." He felt that the spring owner had an imperfect right
to the supply, which was derived through his neighbor's land as compared
with the absolute right to take the minerals, and consequently expressed
the opinion that "the imperfect rights and lesser advantage should give
place to that which is perfect and infinitely the most beneficial to individuals
and to the community in general.""'
159 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
160 id. at 536.
161 25 Pa. at 535. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A (Tent. Draft No.
17, 1973). Query? Should the law recognize a greater right to mine than to use ground-
water? Is mineral scarcity a factor or is it just the rule of capture operating? What if
water is scarce? Compare the risk allocation between groundwater and surface stream
users in Problem Case 18. Is knowledge the turning point?
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Nevertheless, the holding in Wheatley has been consistently followed in
many jurisdictions. In Ohio, it was confirmed without report in Wills Creek
Coal Co. v. Stage, 162 which is reported in passing in Collieries.6 ' In Wills
Creek the charge from the trial court, affirmed by the supreme court
without report read as follows:
If you find that the defendant in mining out that coal, reasonably and
in a proper manner, and to a reasonable and proper extent, and without
intending to do so, in the coal tapped the sources of water in that
well, and destroyed and diverted the same, then the company is not liable
for the destruction of the well....
The difference between Wheatley and Wills Creek Coal is, of course, the
difference between Problem Case 5 and 6; it is the latter to which Wills Creek
Coal belongs. Such cases are not widely reported as water rights cases and
more may be found under listings for mining disputes.'65
Problem Case 6 Interference with groundwater supply by changing flow lines
due to subsurface mining.1 66
The Problem Case 6 situation is very close to that of Case 5, in that the
reduction of the water table is a result of change in the flow pattern of
the groundwater. Subsequent pumping to maintain the operation of the mine
simply accelerates the lowering or rate of interference with the groundwater
and enhances the degree of interference with the neighboring groundwater
supply. As noted, the case of Acton may be a Problem Case 6 situation but it
is not entirely clear from the facts. It is the belief here that no difference
between Case 5 and Case 6 situations would be recognized by the courts in an
absolute or reasonable use rule jurisdiction. In an appropriation rule court,
it is possible that the senior appropriator might have a cause of action as
might a permit holder in a permit state. In a correlative rights jurisdiction
there would be an accommodation presumably. All this assumes the issue
before the court would be one of water rights. 67
Problem Case 7 Interference permanently with groundwater supply by
162 77 Ohio St. 643, 84 N.E. 1135 (1908).
1,3 107 Ohio St. 238, 140 N.E. 356 (1923).
164 Id. at 259, 140 N.E. at 362.
165 See 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 274 (1956): "As a general rule persons engaged
in ordinary mining operations are not responsible for damages caused by diverting or
destroying the flow of percolating waters," citing Sloss Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v.
Wilkes, 236 Ala. 173, 181 So. 276, 764 (1938). The opposite result appears when without
reasonable need or wilfully or negligently wasted or if a result of failure to provide
subjacent support which causes damage to the surface.
166 See Appendix B, fig. 12.
167 Probably the law of mining would prevail, but see the latest Restatement view supra
note 138.
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destruction of reservoir capacity owing to collapse of
reservoir internally by mining of groundwater."' 8
This situation can occur in relatively deeply buried groundwater reservoirs
which are mined to exhaustion for groundwater. An example would be the
agricultural irrigation of the Great Valley of California. The overlying weight
of the sediment in the valley is naturally counteracted by the pressure of the
water in the pores of the sediment or rock.1"9 If all water is removed
(except capillary water), the counter balancing force is removed and the
sediment will tend to compact. Once the grains are permanently compressed,
then recharge of the water into the sediment will not expand them.'
Consequently, complete mining of groundwater can collapse a reservoir. The
illustration shows a small portion of where a well penetrates a sand reservoir
before removal of water and after removal and compaction.
No cases were found in which this Problem Case was litigated, but this
may be an oversight since the physical situation could have been part of an
issue described in another way. It would most likely occur, or have occurred, in
basins of relatively late geological age and thick sedimentary fill, such as many
of the basins of California,171 Washington, Oregon and along the Gulf Coast.'
Problem Case 8 Interference with groundwater supply by diversion of a
stream from its original bed.'
In this situation, as illustrated, a canal is constructed for irrigation or
transportation purposes using the upstream flow of the natural stream. The
diversion lowers the groundwater table in the vicinity of the stream causing
the well to go dry. Surprisingly, no cases were encountered in which this
problem was directly litigated. It would seem logical that this kind of inter-
ference must have arisen and most likely during the time of the great canal
building during the early part of the 19th century. Perhaps such disputes were
"6s See Appendix B, fig. 13.
169 Terzaghi, Simple Tests Determine Hydrostatic Uplift, 116 ENG. NEWS-RECORD 872
(1936).
170 Hydraulic fracturing techniques lift the rock opening fractures and joints. It is unlikely
that compacted grains, even without substantial cement, could be "unstuck."
7' R. MEADE, COMPACTION OF SEDIMENTS UNDERLYING AREAS OF LAND SUBSIDENCE IN
CENTRAL CALIFORNIA 497 (1968).
172 It is not clear that this would be a dispute involving the law of groundwater inasmuch
as the groundwater would be gone. Instead it could be a question of the ownership of
space in the rock. The ownership of pores of a rock, in fact of underground space
generally, is an increasingly important question, not to be considered here. General
reference is made to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1963), which speaks to trespass beneath the surface of the earth. See also NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND ENERGY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE
OF UNDERGROUND SPACE 121 (1974).
173 See Appendix B, fig. 14.
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considered in the framework of riparian rights to continue undiminished flow
of the stream rather than a question of groundwater rights, if they did occur.
Problem Case 9 Interference with groundwater supply by diversion of water
from a stream for use.174
The situation illustrated is that of diversion of water from a stream by a
riparian owner which results in the lowering of the water table in the adjacent
land, causing the well to go dry. No cases were found in which this situation
was litigated. The reason for the lack of cases may be that the laws pertinent
to surface water and groundwater in many states are so separate that combined
complaints never progressed very far in the judicial process. Of course, in
riparian states the river user has the right to a reasonable amount of water
as a property right, while the property owner with the well, if in an absolute
rule jurisdiction, has no right except to what he has captured. Even in a
reasonable use rule state the well owner would have to prove the stream
user's unreasonable (i.e., wasteful, nonbeneficial, malicious) use.
Problem Case 10 Interference with groundwater supply by reducing the level
of an artificial surface reservoir.
17 5
The situation envisioned would be a rare occurrence. The circumstances
illustrated are those where a dam impounds water, for example in the case of
a municipal water supply, and owing to poor construction or possibly an
earthquake, damage to the reservoir requires its abandonment, or at the
minimum, a reduction in the water level behind the dam. In the meantime, an
adjacent landowner has established a water supply from the groundwater
seepage1.. at the higher water table level. The sequence of water table levels
is: (1) original level of stream before construction of the dam; (2) level
stable with more or less permanent lake level; and, (3) lower water table
stable with lower impoundment level.
The situation was litigated in Bullock v. Hanks"' in Utah and revolved
aroun - .e question of a permit. Hanks, the State of Utah's engineer, had issued
a permit to another party to which Bullock objected. An ancillary issue in the
case, which is pertinent here, concerned the groundwater level. Bullock
174See Appendix B, fig. 15.
"75 See Appendix B, fig. 16.
176 SAX, supra note 6, at 213 states that seepage and spring water may be considered
separately because water from these sources frequently does not meet the definition of
water of a natural stream and in some states the appropriation or riparian rights attach
only to natural stream waters. Thus non-stream waters may not be covered by general
state law, or are a property right like groundwater. There is also a problem of "tributary"
seepage which "eventually" will reach a stream and whether it should be considered part
of the stream. See generally 93 C.J.S. Waters § 91 (1956) for rights in springs.
177 22 U.2d 308, 452 P.2d 866 (1969).
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claimed that the additional diversion of impounded water allowed by the state
engineer would lower the water table on his land, "dry up his pasture and
meadows in the winter, and cause freezing of stock water."' Hanks responded
that the plaintiff wanted not only the water rights decreed him (by
appropriation), but demanded that "excess water be left undiverted so as
to maintain the water table through the area." The Utah Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff had no right to water percolating through the soil
before it came onto the land or after it left it and hence had no right
presumably to insist on a higher level of impounded water. The same principle
might be extended to the Problem Case under discussion where the lowering
of the impounded water was involuntary.
Problem Case 11 Interference with groundwater supply by surface drainage
projects.'79
The situation illustrated is for the reclamation of swampy areas where
shallow wells tap the same interconnected water supply between the swamps
and the groundwater. This could be a common situation in Florida or on
Ohio's glacial terrain, and is analogous to the excavation and pumping of a
quarry or a construction ditch (Problem Case 3) except that there is no
excavation. The result of the pumping is to lower the water table below
that depth reached by the well.
This case was litigated in Utah in 1959 in N. M. Long & Co. v. Cannon-
Papanikolas Const. Co.' The suit was for damages and for injunctive relief
based on the claim that the residential developers in the course of improving
their land had drained water from within the adjoining lands of the plaintiffs.
The construction company had 92 acres of land, a greater portion of which
was swampy. They built drains to lower the water table and condition the land
for building. The effect was to lower the water table, of course, and to deplete
the plaintiff's water supply, obviously a very shallow one. Given the high proba-
bility of the existence of an objectively marginal well on the plaintiff's property
and the obvious poor planning practice to allow residential development in a
drained swamp, the district court held for the defendant. The Supreme Court
of Utah, on appeal, held that the defendants were not obligated to anticipate
that drainage of their land would result in reducing waters to other tract
owners and the defendants did not have to permit their land to remain swampy
for the purpose of protecting groundwater supplies of adjoining lands.'
178 Id. at 868.
179 See Appendix B, fig. 17.
180 9 U.2d 307, 343 P.2d 1100 (1959).
181 But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1973).
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Problem Case 12 Interference with groundwater supply by paving or other
change in the infiltration (recharge) area.182
The situation inherent in this case is one which occurs commonly in
areas undergoing urbanization and is accompanied many times by increased
flooding. As illustrated, the paving of the hilltop eliminates recharge and
lowers the water table under that area. Such problems can be far more
complex than illustrated because a recharge or infiltration area may be
literally hundreds of miles from the site of production of water from a
confined aquifer and may lie in another state or another country. The case
was litigated in Friedland v. State.83 where interference not only reduced
the infiltration rate but indeed did cause flooding. Under a reasonable use
rule, the defendant was not found liable.
In Friedland, the State of New York had constructed a road in the
catchment area and this resulted in decreased soil water adsorption. In a
subsequent dry season, water was no longer able to penetrate the ground and
sufficiently raise the water table. The lower water level caused the plaintiff's
pond to stagnate and an excessive growth of algae occurred. In the wet season,
the surface flow was more rapid and the runoff flooded the pond. The plaintiff
desired damages for his pond. The court held that there was no unreasonable
interference by the State of New York with groundwater. The result seems
contrary to the results of other cases that are analogous in which the state
was cited for "taking" or a trespass in the case of floodwaters.
Problem Case 13 Interference with groundwater supply by subsurface grouting
or cementing in mines.
The case envisioned would doubtless be a rare one by itself. It is more
likely to occur in a situation which developed in combination with Problem
Cases involving mining and petroleum development. By analogy, it appears
that in either an absolute or a reasonable use jurisdiction, as in the cases
involving quarrying operations, the courts probably would focus on the
reasonable use of the property by the owner and his alleged inability to
predict that the grouting in his mine could affect the groundwater supply
of neighboring wells.
Problem Case 14 Interference with groundwater supply by well drilling pro-
cedures such as mud programs.
The case described here is similar to Problem Cases 13 and 15. It does
not involve the common effect of well programs which cause problems, namely
the pollution of the groundwater supply with liquid or gaseous petroleum. The
22 See Appendix B, fig. 18.
S3 35 App. Div. 2d 755, 314 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1970).
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illustration found in Appendix B, Fig. 11, can be extended to cover the present
case by assuming the establishment of a gas storage field with drilling wells
at the edge of the field. Owing to loss of circulation in a well, huge quantities
of drilling mud or cement are forced down the wells which causes the
disturbance of the groundwater flow.
Interestingly, a case was found which appears to consider the situation. In
Sycamore Coal Co. v. Stanley,' the plaintiff (defendant in error, Stanley)
brought an action against the coal company to recover damages for the
destruction of a well on his land and received a verdict in the amount of $475.
The Stanley farm adjoined land on which the company had drilled a core
hole to a depth of 28 feet about 60 feet from the farm. The coring or drilling
was carried out to determine the thickness and quality of coal seams underlying
the land, a standard exploration technique. The drilling caused the Stanleys'
well level to drop. After filling the core hole with cement, the water rose in the
Stanley well to a depth of 14 inches where it previously had a depth of 41/2
feet. The Kentucky court found for the coal company, stating that:
Here, the appellant was using its land in a legitimate manner, and it drilled
the hole for a necessary and useful purpose. There is nothing in the proof
tending to show that the injury to the appellee's well should have been
anticipated by appellant, and there is no question of malice or waste. 8 '
In Ohio, there is a statutory provision regarding the plugging and
abandonment of an oil or gas well which passes through a potable water
stratum.' The statute provides for bridging the hole a minimum of 50 feet
below all potable water-bearing strata."7 Further, there are provisions for
casing wells so as to exclude all surface fresh or salt (connate) water from any
part of the well from penetrating fresh water strata. 8 While these provisions
do not directly speak to the Problem Case, they do provide a penalty.89 for
their non-observance and very likely would be pertinent to any litigation of
the facts about this type of occurrence and dispute.
Problem Case 15 Interference with groundwater supply by cavity utilization.
A situation could develop where groundwater flow would be impeded due
to the establishment of a high pressure gas storage facility in the subsurface.
The illustration in Appendix B, Fig. 11, covers this situation by simply
considering the gas to be under pressure, a normal condition in such storage
situations. No cases were discovered, which considered groundwater rights,
1
8 4 292 Ky. 168, 166 S.W.2d 293 (1942).
185 Id. at 170, 166 S.W.2d at 294.
186 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.16 (Page Supp. 1973).
187 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.17 (Page Supp. 1973).
188 Id.
'9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.99 (Page Supp. 1973).
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where this situation had been considered in the courts. With the rapidly
increasing use of cavities for the pumped storage of electricity, petroleum
products, groundwater, surface water, gas and garbage, the possibility of
dispute arises. It appears by analogy, that in either an absolute or reasonable
use jurisdiction there would be no liability (lacking malice, strict liability
imposed by statute, negligence, contract provisions, etc.) in a straightforward
interference case.
In Ohio, the underground storage of gas is regulated by the state under
the provisions of Chapter 4161 of the Ohio Revised Code. While there are
extensive provisions for safeguarding against interference of gas storage facili-
ties with regard to mines, none appear to be directly applicable to potable water
supplies. The effects of federal legislation and regulations, made pursuant to the
Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, have not been analyzed in this context.19 °
Problem Case 16 Damage by encroachment of salt water into a freshwater
supply along coast line.19'
Salt water, being denser, does not mix easily with fresh water in a
non-turbulent reservoir. Fresh-water lenses along the seacoast and on isolated
oceanic islands or banks may exist to a depth below sea level seven times the
height of the water lens above sea level. This established fact accounts for
the possibility of early settlement of such cities as Nassau in the Bahamas.
Pumping of the groundwater, however, may cause the salt water to be
drawn into the well. Reestablishment of a completely sweet water reservoir,
once contaminated with salt water, is extremely difficult owing to capillary
pressure and ion exchange effects.
The situation was considered in the case of City Mill Co. v. Honolulu
Sewer & Water Co.,'92 in 1929, in a permit situation. The petitioner, City
Mill, had applied for a permit to drill a well which provided that if, in the
opinion of the commission, the proposed work threatened the safety of
the water of the area which would be drawn upon by such a well, the permit
should be denied.1 9
3
City Mill wanted a well exploiting about 50,000 gallons a day. There
were already 21 active wells drawing 8 million gallons a day in the basin. The
application was denied on two grounds. First, the reason was given that
the draft on the basin was already larger than the supply or infiltration and,
190 Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 300(g) (1974) requires the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency to set primary drinking water standards for various
pollutants in water supplies of public water systems serving 15 or more connections,
including supplies from groundwater. See also 40 Fed. Reg. 51, 11990-98, 1975.
91 See Appendix B, fig. 19.
19230 Haw. 912 (1929).
193 Id. at 915.
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second, that the salt content of the wells near the proposed location was
already high, and that water from the proposed well would become too salty for
domestic use resulting in the loss of the well. The issue came to the Hawaii
court which addressed it as a "taking" question. The court stated:
The question now before us is not whether or to what extent the Territory
or its agent the sewer and water commission may regulate the boring or
the operation ... of artesian wells, but whether it may, without
compensation... prohibit the ... new well, while at the same time
leaving all users of existing wells at liberty to draw water therefrom."'
In other words, the court seems to be asking the question of whether the
appropriation doctrine is constitutional if one potential user is left out in
the cold, or whether all landowners who could have a right to groundwater
extraction are to be included to some extent under a rule similar to the
correlative rights rule. Of course, the constitutionality of the appropriation
rule had been affirmed in other states, wihout the qualifying requirement of
saving water for potential users. However, Hawaii decided otherwise.
The Hawaii court found that if there had been any increase in the salinity
of Honolulu's waters in the basin, it was not the fault of City Mill, but was
done by the wells already in operation. The court felt that the remedy should
be to reduce usage by those already obtaining groundwater, and not by wholly
excluding the applicant from having his reasonable share. The court concludes
with the observation that it would be abhorrent to a sense of justice, and in
violation of the applicant's rights as a co-owner of the artesian basin's waters,
to prevent him from using the water. The decision is most interesting because,
in protecting the rights of City Mills, it shows a remarkable inability of the
court to manage a water basin and is opposed to the Raymond Basin solution '
arrived at later in California. It seems to adopt by inference the approval of
the correlative rights rule and to consider untaken water property.
The case really does not speak to the other questions regarding salt water
intrusion. There is no consideration of whether salt water intrusion could be
considered a trespass, whether it is a natural substance, hence not a pollutant, 19c
and other definitional problems. The order of the commission was set aside and
the appellant's prayer for a permit granted upon reasonable specifications.
Similar cases might be expected from the State of Florida, California, and
194 Id. at 922.
195 See BEUSCHER, supra note 6, at 53.
1
,,
6 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 133 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886) (acid minedrainage is "from natural, not artificial causes" hence not a pollutant). Contra, RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A, Comment a at 159 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1973).
"Harm caused to groundwater users whose withdrawals do not materially contribute to
salt water intrusion (by a single operator) is unreasonable."
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along both coastlines. It is well known that the City of New York has restricted
large scale pumping on Long Island for decades to prevent salt water intrusion.
Problem Case 17 Interference with groundwater supply by rise in ground-
water table from an artificial reservoir. 97
The situation illustrated is the first phase of the sequence of events
leading to a Problem Case 10 situation which involves the lowering of the
reservoir. It is difficult to imagine the issue being raised if the result is that
a greater water supply is made available. However, as illustrated here, if
there is another use being made of the subsurface, which could be interfered
with by raising the groundwater table, e.g., flooding of a cave or mine, then
the situation might result in litigation.
In theory the situation is similar to that considered in Miksch,1"8 if in fact
the damage is to the surface of the land. Following the reasoning of that court
in holding the flooding a trespass,1"' or following the reasoning of Rylands, as
relied upon in Ball v. Nye, 0° one is liable without other proof of negligence,
i.e., one is strictly liable." 1
Problem Case 18 Interference with stream flow by use of groundwater. 2
The case envisions the opposite situation of that considered in Problem
Case 9. Both illustrate the common hydrologic situation where the stream and
groundwater are interconnected. This Problem Case was litigated in Ohio in
Warder and there the pumper was enjoined from taking groundwater to an
extent that it would interfere with stream water. Apparently, the Ohio case is
in line with decisions in many other jurisdictions, including those which adhere
to the reasonable use and appropriation rules, generally finding a superior
right to riparian use over that of groundwater usage.
In Connecticut in 1940, a dispute arose between two corporations which
was resolved in Hartford Rayon Corp. v. Cromwell Water Co.2 " The plaintiff,
praying for an injunction, had a dam on Dividend Brook in Rocky Hill,
Connecticut, since 1924. The creek flowed at the rate of 2 million gallons per
197 See Appendix B, fig. 20.
198 128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E. 387 (1934).
190 Contra, Shanan v. Brown, 179 Ala. 425, 60 So. 891 (1913) where the owner of city
lots constructed a lake by building a wall around several natural depressions on his land
causing retardation in seepage of groundwater. It was held that the lower property owner
owed no duty to the upper to afford drainage for unchanneled subsurface water, applying
the "common enemy" doctrine. See also CALLAHAN supra note 24, at 40, citing Crawford
v. Rambo, 44 Ohio St. 279, 7 N.E. 429 (1886) (stating the same rule for Ohio).
20099 Mass. 582 (1868).
201 See also Kall v. Carruthers, 59 Cal. App. 555, 211 P.43 (1922); Malliet v. Taylor, 78
Ore. 208, 152 P. 873 (1915).202 See Appendix B, fig. 21.
202 126 Conn. 194. 10 A.2d 587 (1940).
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day and the Hartford Corporation used a considerable portion of that flow
for half its needs and took the rest from three wells. The defendant supplied
water to the town of Cromwell. Facing an inadequate and polluted water
supply, the Cromwell Co. bought seven acres on Dividend Brook, one mile
above the Hartford factory. Cromwell planned to sink a well 100 feet from
the brook and withdraw 150,000 gallons per day. The court, citing Greenleaf
as supportive of the absolute rule in the state, held that an injunction did not
lie to prevent drilling a well on the basis that the groundwater would be
captured before flowing into the stream, until it was proven that the well
would divert the stream. Hence, there was no cause of action.
The case cited for the perfection of the absolute rule is Chasemore
v. Richards,-° a Problem Case 18 situation. In Chasemore, the opposite was
held from that in Cromwell. It was stated that a land and mill owner had no
right to a continued stream supply from percolating water as against the
adjoining Town of Corydon, whose extensive well operations caused the loss
of plaintiff's use. The court maintained this position even though the plaintiff
claimed a prescriptive right of 60 years! Clearly, Chasemore is not the law
in Ohio if Warder is, even though Chasemore is cited with favor by Judge
Brinkerhoff as a basis for his decision in Frazier.
Likewise, in Fire District No. 1 v. Graniteville Spring Water Co.,2 5 the
Vermont court distinguished this Problem Case from the Problem Case 1
situation where it has consistently applied the absolute rule. There again, two
corporations selling water came into conflict. The defendant held the water
rights from the landowner to all but the flow from two natural springs on her
land. The plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent diverting water on any part
of the landowner's farm. The court relied, it said, on Chatfield"°6 and Chasemore
but managed to avert the absolute rule by applying a definition. It stated that
"once spring water becomes a part of a stream the absolute rule ceases." Hence
the lower owner has a right in the spring which flowed and the defendant was
not allowed to divert it by drawing groundwater from the stream which flowed
from the spring unless he could do so within his riparian right. The court
thus distinguished their holding from the earlier one in Chatfield.
In New Jersey, the court in Meeker v. East Orange,"' changed its rule
when faced with the question of interference of 20 city artesian wells by
204 2 Hurl & Norman Rep. 982 (1857). Chasemore effectively overruled Dickenson v.
Grand Junction Canal Co., 7 Exch. 282, 21 L.J. Exch. 241 (1852) where the defendant
canal company operated a well on its own land to supply water to the summit of the
divide. It pumped down the stream flow depriving the riparian mill owner of his normal
flow.
205 103 Vt. 89, 152 A. 42 (1930).
206 28 Ut. 49 (1855).
207 77 N.J.L. 623, 74A. 379 (1909).
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Meeker's riparian rights to use Canoe Creek for a domestic supply by diverting
groundwater before it entered the stream. Finding the reasoning upon which
the English rule rests unsatisfactory and inconsistent with legal principles-
in short, might makes right-the court adopted the reasonable use rule for
New Jersey, thus preventing the city's exportation and sale of water to
Meeker's detriment without liability for damage.
In appropriation rule states, there has been a similar outcome. In
California "I and Utah 209 the situation arose where the right of the landowner
to take groundwater interfered with prior appropriator's rights on a nearby
stream. In both states the courts prevented the use of the groundwater to
the extent that such use interfered with the prior surface water use. In
New York, a similar rule was adopted where the diversion of the groundwater
was to land not within the basin.210
Problem Case 19 Interference with the level of a surface reservoir or lake by
use of the groundwater supply.211
The case is similar to Problem Case 18, involving the same physical
principles, but with the difference that the surface water level is the result of
impoundment rather than stream flow. It is the opposite of Case 10 where the
groundwater production is reduced as the result of the lowering of the reservoir.
The case has been litigated in England in English v. Metropolitan Water
Board,21 2 which is important for the absolute rule jurisdictions because of the
civic nature of the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's
pumping station and water operations caused the subsoil water level to fall as
a result of which his pools were drained. This rendered them worthless as a
site for spawning fish and fishing grounds and as a place for the cultivation of
watercress. The defendant was pumping 1 million gallons per day. The King's
Bench decided for the defendant, agreeing that his operations did cause
a substantial lowering of the water level, but saying that it was well established
that the plaintiff had "no right of support" by water removed by the defendant
on his own land.
Judging from the cases cited in the review of Problem Case 18, it
208 Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsey-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d
972 (1935).
209 Silver King Consol. Mining Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297, 39 P.2d 682 (1934).
210 Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 18 App. Div. 340, 46 N.Y.S. 141 (1897). Fortunately, the
courts are not in competition for prizes. It is hard to see why interfering well owners in
Vermont are not liable to one another because of lack of knowledge by the well owner
of the secret and occult movement of groundwater but a well owner who interferes with
stream water flow by pumping is liable. How is he to know that it is his well that is
interfering? From a scientific standpoint, if the one is knowable, so is the other.
211 See Appendix B, fig. 22.
212 [1907] 1 K.B. 588. See also MYERS supra note 6, at 573.
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would be reasonable to assume that the courts would not agree with the
King's Bench in the United States, but would rule consistent with American
decisions in analogous situations, restricting the groundwater user.2"
Problem Case 20 Damage to mine from withdrawal of groundwater."'
The case outlined here is one in which removal of groundwater has the
same effect on a mine as removal has on subsidence and collapse of surface
features. The geological principles appear the same. In the illustration, the
lowering of the groundwater table by pumping of three wells in the sandstone
reservoir reduces the water table below the overlying limestone used for storage
which then begins to dissolve it and form caves. The cave formation breaks
through into the base of the overlying coal mine causing damage to the mine.
No cases were discovered in which this situation was litigated. It would
seem likely to occur in a geographic area like Pennsylvania or West Virginia. If
in an absolute rule or reasonable rule jurisdiction, it is questionable whether
there would be a cause of action with regard to water rights. Inasmuch
as the support removed, as illustrated, would be lateral support (from
the standpoint of the pumper's land) it appears likely that the courts
would not declare any liability. 1 Of course, the situation might be covered
by regulation or statutory law.
213 See discussion Problem Case 18 supra. Cf. United States v. Cappaert, 375 F. Supp.
456 (Nev., 1974) where an injunction was held to lie which limited the pumping of a
groundwater user to the detriment of the superior appropriation holder of a natural pool,
the Devil's Hole. The superior holder, the United States, claimed the Devil's Hole pupfish
was endangered by a drop in water level in the Hole owing to defendant's pumping. The
court limited the pumping to the amount which maintained daily mean water level using
the authority of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 1531. See also U.S.
v. 1,629.6 Acres of 'Land More or Less in Sussex Co., State of Delaware, 503 F.2d 764
(3d Cir. 1974) where it was held that no riparian rights accrued to property owner on
an inlet formed by artificial means absent reliance on the use of the inlet that could be
regarded as natural.
214 See Appendix B, fig. 23.
215 See generally 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 277 (1956). A surface owner is
generally entitled to lateral support of his land in the natural state and an owner of land
carrying on mining operations and depriving an adjoining owner of lateral support is
liable for injuries to the land from such operations. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 818 (1939) "To the extent that a person is not liable for withdrawing
subterranean waters from the land of another, he is not liable for a subsidence of the
other's land which is caused by the withdrawal." But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 818 (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969): Withdrawing Subterranean Substances. "One
who is privileged to withdraw subterranean water, oil, minerals or other substances from
under the land of another is not for that reason privileged to cause a subsidence of the
other's land by such withdrawal."
Note that the Tentative Draft would include subsurface property subject to
damage. The reporter (at 2) states that he "is unable to see why there should be any
distinction according to what the defendant has withdrawn [contrasting the holdings
regarding withdrawal of water and mineral-no liability versus strict liability]. The
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Problem Case 21 Damage to cavity utilization by withdrawal of groundwater.""6
The case is identical to Problem Case 20, except that the cavity instead
of being a mine, i.e., the excavation of a mineral resource, is a place of storage
(radioactive wastes, 17 garbage, o- 8 or valuable records). The damage to such
storage cavities is potentially very dangerous in some parts of the United
States. For example, the experimentation and proposed storage of highly toxic
and very long life radioactive waste in salt mines near Lyons, Kansas, must be
protected for hundreds of years from all groundwater (or other well)
interference" 9 or catastrophic health dangers could result. No case law was
discovered involving this situation, but it appears that it may be a problem of
grave concern in the near future.
Problem Case 22 Damage to overlying surface by withdrawal of ground-
water. 220
The case illustrated is one for a limestone terrain where the possibilities
of removal of subsurface support by dissolution of carbonate rock are great. If
dissolution proceeds to a sufficient extent, collapse features, which underground
are recognized as caves, may extend to the surface causing sink holes. These
are common in limestone terrain naturally, an example of which would be
central Ohio. The situation has not been litigated in Ohio to the writer's
knowledge. Analogous situations have been considered with disparate results,
but generally, the courts have held that the overlying landowner is entitled
to subsurface support of his land.2"'
In two cases involving mining in Virginia, Couch v. Clinchfield Coal
Corp.,2'-2 and Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 2 13 the courts held that the
Advisors and the Council, meeting the problem for the first time are in some doubt, but
express themselves as willing to follow the majority of the cases," i.e., contra to the
Tentative Draft statement and in accord with the old § 818 position.
216 See Appendix B, fig. 24.
217 See McClain, Status for AEC Project to Establish a Salt Mine Radioactive Waste
Repository, in FOURTH SYMPOSIUM ON SALT 337-42 (A. Coogan ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as McClain].
218 See Rogers, Process for Refuse Disposal in Solution-Mined Salt Cavities, in FOURTH
SYMPOSIUM ON SALT 329-36 (A. Coogan ed. 1974). Rogers, REFUSE DISPOSAL METHOD,
U.S. Patent No. 3,665,716.
219 McClain, supra note 184.
220 See Appendix B, fig. 25.
221 See generally 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 278 (1956) noting the general rule that
one who owns surface land or a higher stratum holds subject to the right of the under-
lying owner to mine, but there is no right to destroy or injure the overlying land or
stratum. In removing the minerals he must leave support sufficient to maintain the
surface of the higher stratum in its natural state, citing numerous cases from the eastern
coal field region including Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Comption, 148 Va. 437, 139 S.E.
308 (1927). See also Annot., 55 A.L.R. 1376 (1928).
22 148 Va. 455, 139 S.E. 314 (1927). 22 3 119 Va. 271, 89 S.E. 305 (1916).
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miner is liable for subjacent support of the overlying land, presumably if that
right has not been contracted away.2" ' These mining cases do not involve the
removal of groundwater per se as the cause of surface subsidence, but if
the landowner is entitled to surface support, he should be entitled to it
regardless of the particular physical cause of the subsidence.
Problem Case 23 Damage to surface of adjacent land by withdrawal of
groundwater from mine, quarry or other excavation. 25
The situation described in this Problem Case is illustrated for a quarry
and has been litigated repeatedly for situations involving trenching, ditching,
excavations for foundations of houses and cuts for roads. As illustrated, the
case involves dissolution of limestone as the result of the lowering of the water
table by pumping of a wet quarry. This was the fact situation in Finley
v. Teeter Stone Inc.," 6 a fairly recent Maryland case in which liability was
denied. It differs from similar situations in that no "visible soil" is removed.
The material loss is caused by solution, and the damage is the result of collapse
of the surface rather than simply by differential settling of highly sensitive soils.
But both situations appear to be encompassed within this Problem Case.
The case law generally tends toward a finding of no liability in this
factual situation, 7 but there is some contrary authority. In addition, cases
are distinguished on the basis of whether the court finds that "soil" as well as
water are taken or disturbed resulting in loss of lateral support.
In an early English case, Poppelwell v. Hodkinson,2 liability was denied.
There the defendant contractor was building a church and excavated a deep
foundation which drained water from the plaintiff's adjacent land. As a result,
the land subsided and the cottages on it were damaged. The court found
"nothing in the common law to prevent" a person from draining his soil "if it
becomes convenient or necessary." Poppelwell can be cited for the precedent
that while there is an absolute duty not to remove lateral support, there is
an exception when the lateral support is removed solely through the agency of
the withdrawal of groundwater.
The case law generally follows Poppelwell, as does the Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 818. The cases which differ from Poppelwell, for
224 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
225 See Appendix B, fig. 26.
226 251 Md. 428, 248 A.2d 106 (1968).
227 See, e.g. Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868). Contra, Farnadis v. Great Northern R.
Co., 41 Wash. 486, 84 P. 18 (1906), where defendant company tunneling in a street
tapped groundwater affecting the lateral support of plaintiff's land.
228 L.R.4 Exch. 248 (1869).
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example, the Massachusetts and Ohio cases below, find the courts distinguish-
ing removal of soil, sand, clay, silt or other material mixed with groundwater
from the removal of groundwater alone, and finding liability generally on a
strict liability basis and without much discussion of the role of water. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 818 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1973) recom-
mends revision of the rule but finds little support in the case law for imposing
liability for removal of lateral support from groundwater interference alone.
The leading Ohio case, Columbus v. Williard,29 found the city in the
1890's constructing a sewer and pumping sand and water out of the excavation
which was "so blended" as to be "inseparable." The trial court found for
the plaintiff based on the doctrine of liability for removal of support
material, noting the contrary doctrine.
In a similar fact situation in 1964, however, the Massachusetts court did
hold a contractor liable. In Gamer v. Milton 3' the contractor was removing
gravel from the area of Turner's pond for the Town of Milton. To get
the gravel, he pumped water out of the pond and into a nearby creek (thus
wasting it?). The pumping lowered the water table by 24 feet in the gravel pit
and removed sufficient water from the subsoil to cause settling of adjacent
houses around the pond. The court held the contractor (and town) liable on
the basis that he did not take precautions to establish observation holes to see
if the water level was going down (a duty he apparently had!), and that he
did not establish recharge wells. Note that the court specifically found that
this was not a case involving a question of water rights saying that "a
landowner has the absolute ownership in subsurface percolating water on his
land. He may use it as he sees fit, even if such use results in loss of water
in his neighbor's land."2 31
The court cited Cabot v. Kingman 232 as governing. In Cabot a contractor,
without taking precautions, pumped a mixture of fine sand and silt in water
out of a trench and removed this "soil" from the plaintiff's land. In Gamer, the
court said there was no basis to distinguish Cabot merely because there was no
evidence of any soil in the water removed by the contractor. That is, in Cabot
the court was saying that the lateral support being removed was soil in water
which is the same as removal of soil and rock. Here the court went farther
than Cabot and said that the soil does not have to be removed; lateral support
can be removed solely by removing water. It held "the contractor was negligent
in causing the removal of percolating water in surrounding areas, and the
resulting settling of adjacent houses without digging observation holes, sheath-
2297 Ohio C. Dec. 33 (1893), afl'd, 54 Ohio St. 615 (1896).
230 346 Mass. 617, 195 N.E.2d 65 (1964).
231 Id. at 620, 195 N.E.2d at 67.
2 2 166 Mass. 403, 44 N.E. 344 (1896).
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ing or sinking recharge wells, even though the water carried no soil in it." 1
There is considerable confusion in the language of courts regarding the
removal of lateral support and what it takes to remove lateral support. Thus
in an earlier Massachusetts case, New York R.R. v. Marniccuci,2 4 a mixture
of water and silt was found to be the same as sand (a conclusion which would
rate the court an "F" in freshman geology) and the court held that an action
will lie for an excavation causing injury to soil of an adjacent owner in its
natural state, but no recovery will be allowed in the absence of negligence
or direct trespass to structures by excavating adjoining land. The court found
that the sheathing had not been driven deep enough to prevent groundwater
seepage and the contractor was held negligent in not doing so, having a duty
of reasonable care to prevent such seepage and collapse.
While the court might not have found the contractor liable if only
groundwater seepage were the cause of the damage, the mixture of the silt with
water was sufficient to recognize this as removal of lateral support. Apparently,
the court was seeking some justification of its solution, regardless of the fact
that it was a fair one. Note that the silt and sand would not move in a low
relief situation without the presence of water.
A contrary position was reached in Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc.2"5 Teeter
owned 100 acres which he used for quarrying limestone since 1958. The
quarry floor was excavated to a depth of 80 feet in the Wakefield Marble, a
rock formation which contained many sink holes in the valley along which
it ran. The rock formation is steeply dipping (unlike the illustration in the
Problem Case) and is overlain by residual clay and a soil mantle 17 to 30 feet
thick at the surface. The drawdown of the water table by the pumps in the
quarry greatly increased the velocity of groundwater flow in the Wakefield
Marble causing an increased rate of solution. Before pumping, the water was
essentially static. As a result, the storm and rain water falling on Finley's land
ran through the mantle into the limestone taking with it the mantle clay
into the fissures and fractures in the limestone at an increased rate. The
result was the collapse of the clay mantle over such fissures up to the surface
and the formation of sink holes on Finley's land.
Part of the issue here revolved around the question of lateral support,
that is, how could Teeter be held liable for removing lateral support when the
support directly causing the sinkholes was vertical? However, the court found
that no negligence was alleged or found on the part of Teeter in pumping his
quarry. There was no claim or evidence of an underground stream and no
233 346 Mass. at 620-21, 195 N.E.2d at 67.
234 337 Mass. 469, 149 N.E. 680 (1958).
235 251 Md. 428, 248 A.2d 106 (1968).
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proof of loss of lateral support, all factors which might influence a decision
on grounds other than those considered. It appears that the situation was
viewed as a question of the right to subjacent support "laterally." In any
case, the court in its explanation of its ruling said:
It was suggested [that] ... an expanded "American Rule" should be
adopted by us. There is little question the Finleys have been gravely
injured by the sink holes, and although we are sympathetic with their
plight, we are of the opinion that we must adhere to the authorities we
have cited. If the present law requires change ... a remedy lies with
the General Assembly.2 3 6
The injury to the Finleys was held to be damnum absque injuria. The
argument was made that the law relating to use of percolating water should
not apply and that the law relating to support of the land should be dispositive.
But the court, in considering this argument, reemphasized the difference
between subjacent support and lateral support, saying there was "no sidewise
movement of soil or rock from Finley's land" into the Teeter quarry (hence
not following the Massachusetts court in Gamer) and argued that:
Water... is known to flow in response to virtually every change in
conditions. It is primarily because of this dynamic quality that we cannot
hold that interference with the support provided by water is subject to the
same rules of absolute liability that are imposed on a landowner who
deprives his neighbor of the natural support provided by soils and other
more solid materials (emphasis added)."'
Without regard to the different chemical nature of the rock, there really
can be no question that this mineral material, the calcium carbonate making
up the Wakefield Marble, was "stationary and provided a foundation for the
overlying land" and was caused to be "removed from its position of rest."
Thus, it should have satisfied the tests which the court posed for evidence
of lateral support. As noted in Myers,"2 8 the case has been criticized, yet
it is a majority holding.
Unlike the Problem Cases dealing with the interference of one ground-
water user with another (the resultant problems of management of groundwater
in addition to liability), this Problem Case deals primarily with liability and
consequently can be viewed in terms of a choice of social policy regarding
the allocation of risk for damage. Either rule would work, if insured against.
Problem Case 24 Damage to groundwater supply by surface collapse or
subsidence underground mining."3 9
2361 d. at 445, 248 A.2d at 116-17.
2 3d. at 443, 248 A.2d at 116.
238 See MYERS, supra note 6, at 577.
219 See Appendix B, fig. 27.
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This rather rare situation involving water rights considers the case where
the subsurface collapse of strata due to improper mining practices causes the
loss of groundwater supplies. As illustrated, it involves the actual loss of
the well string. The case has been litigated in Ohio in Collieries Co. v. Cocke,' °
where in spite of the rule that no rights to the protection of groundwater
supplies exist from interference by pumpers, the defendant was found liable for
the removal of subjacent support and physical damage to the water supply.
Problem Case 25 Damage from slide conditions enhanced by rise in water
table owing to recharge from artificial reservoir.2 '
In the case where structures are built on relatively stable soils when
dry, but which become nearly liquid when wetted, the rise of the groundwater
table may cause swelling and potential for landslides or flowage on gentle slopes.
A tragic and profound example of the damage which can occur from this
physical situation occurred in Italy where after the construction of the Viont
Dam2"' there was a catastrophic slide. The rise in the water level behind the
dam lubricated a major fault which had not adequately been surveyed by
the surface and subsurface geologic and engineering exploration of the area.
Further rise in the water level behind the dam after its completion caused
noticeable movement of visible slide materials above the dam. The engineers
lowered the water level fearing damage to the dam itself from a potential
slide. The real event was unanticipated. Slippage along the deeper seated fault
occurred dumping thousands of tons of rock into the lake. The water, mixed
with rock and mud, spilled over the dam in such an amount and at such a
velocity that it went down the narrow valley and covered a substantial part
of the village of Villalonga a few miles below the dam in a couple of minutes.
The result was complete destruction of the town and loss of many lives.
Presumably, the destruction of the town by released surface water,
regardless of the cause of the release of the water from the dam (which itself
remained intact), would be compensable under the rule of Rylands. The less
spectacular situation which does not involve surface water but simply a
landslide caused by wetting the soil is not clear. It is not known whether
this has been litigated in Ohio, but following the reasoning in Miksch, it is
possible that damage from a slide due to increasing the level of groundwater
could be held to be a trespass.
Problem Case 26 Damage by flooding of surface from increased water supply
240 107 Ohio St. 238 (1923).
241 See Appendix B, fig. 28.
242 GASKILL, The Night the Mountain Fell, Reader's Digest, May 1965, at 59.
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and rise of groundwater table owing to recharge from
a surface reservoir. 24 3
The case illustrated considers the situation where the construction of a
dam and impoundment of surface waters raises the water table so that seepage
through the porous strata adjacent to the reservoir causes flooding and swampy
conditions on neighboring land. The case was considered by the Ohio Supreme
Court in Barberton v. Miksch 1" where the court held the defendant liable
on the theory of trespass rather than one having to do with water rights.
In an early Massachusetts case, Ball v. Nye," '4 the doctrine of Rylands
was applied to subsurface flooding waters. In Nye, the court was dealing with a
defendant who had maintained an open septic hole in his barn in which manure
collected. The water in this hole seeped through the ground in a downhill
direction and entered the neighboring basement through the wall and the well
of Ball. The defendant pled that there was no legal liability for damages to
land by mere subterranean water, citing Greenleaf2"I and Acton,2"' but the
court held that one who maintains a vault so that filthy water habitually filters
from it, whether above or below the surface of the ground, into the land of a
neighbor, is liable in damages for the injury without other proof of negligence.2"
Other courts have followed the general concept of liability from water
seeping through the ground. Thus, in Kall v. Carruthers,"' a 1922 California
case, the plaintiff prayed for an injunction to prevent the defendant from
flooding his orchard by seepage of groundwater from the defendant's rice
fields. The defendant, a grower along the Sutter-Butte Canal, kept his land
wet much of the year. The resultant lateral seepage of water through the dikes
flooded the adjacent orchard and damaged the trees. The California court
considered the question in the light of Rylands and found if one maintains
an "artificial receptacle" which fails to properly hold water, then this falls into
the category of a nuisance or under condemnation of negligence. 5 °
Problem Case 27 Damage to surface by soil compaction owing to removal
of groundwater and consequent collapse or shrinkage of
the soil.2"1
243 See Appendix B, fig. 29.
244 128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E. 387 (1934).
24599 Mass. 582 (1868).
241 18 Pick. 117 (Mass. 1836).
217 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
248 99 Mass. at 582.24
959 Cal. App. 555,211 P. 43 (1922).
250 Id. at 557, 211 P. at 45. See also Parker v. Larsen, 86 Cal. 236, 24 P. 11 (1898);
Malliet v. Taylor, 78 Ore. 208, 152 P. 873 (1915).
251 See Appendix B, fig. 30.
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This situation may be a common one in areas where swelling clays consti-
tute the surface of the ground. The case was litigated in Biorvatn v. Pacific
Mechanical Construction Inc.,252 where the court did consider the case to be
one of water rights, found that no liability existed for removal of groundwater
by pumping or excavation, but nevertheless held the defendant (and the city
of Seattle who had contracted for the job) liable because it was in effect con-
demning the property and should have been required to pay for the easement.
In Bjorvatn, the defendant had excavated a trench 36 feet deep for a
sewer which was below the groundwater table. The effect was to lower the
water table increasing the effective load on compressible soil supporting
the house of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had purchased the house with
significant damage due to previous soil compaction. He repaired the house and
no further damage occurred until the sewer work began. Then the house
settled again, the fireplace cracked and the chimney separated from the wall.
The court found that the construction was the proximate cause of the
house settling and awarded $5,000 in damages. The defendant had claimed
that he had rightfully impeded the groundwaters and relied on Evans v.
Seattle,252 in which the defendant opened a gravel pit draining away a spring
with impunity. The court in Bjorvatn agreed with the decision in Evans but
distinguished it from the situation here by noting that the metropolitan
government is not the same as a private landowner who is interfering with
another private landowner. Instead, the city, acting in the role of condemnor
by removing vertical and lateral support, was in violation of the constitution of
the state of Washington if it took the plaintiff's property without compensation.
Problem Case 28 Damage from landslides around a reservoir caused by rapid
fall of the reservoir level and water table.24
The situation envisioned here is the opposite of that presented in Problem
Case 25. Both are physically possible, depending on the soil conditions, although
the addition of water to the soil is generally more often the cause of landslides
than its removal. No cases were found in which this situation was litigated.
CONCLUSION
General Groundwater Rights
Under the absolute rule, as announced in Acton and Frazier, individual-
ism is permitted to reign rampant so long as malice, negligence or useless waste
is not shown. While Ohio and Vermont still follow this doctrine, the obvious
impossibility of its relentless application to a society which has become more
252 164 P.2d 432 (Wash., 1970).
253 182 Wash. 450, 47 P.2d 984 (1935).
254 See Appendix B, fig. 31.
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dependent on groundwater supplies for industry, agriculture and large scale
domestic needs, has led to its modification in many states. 5 '
Missouri, Delaware and Wisconsin which operate under the reasonable
use rule, as modified, permit each private landowner the reasonable use of
water, including allowance for some harm to the common groundwater supply
of neighbors. This also applies to interference with groundwater from other
reasonable uses of the land. As applied, the rule may require that water
cannot be transported away from the property where it is located to the
injury of other overlying landowners, even though use away from the land
may be more beneficial to the community. In addition to this undesirable
consequence, the reasonable use rule is seen by some as totally ambiguous and
unpredictable. It provides "no guide" to prospective water users, -2 nor does it
offer even part protection to the "little guy." Strict application of the reasonable
use rule does not permit the courts to consider and evaluate the various factors
on both sides and arrive at an accommodation. -57
To overcome this difficulty, an equalitarian rigidity has been introduced
in the name of correlative rights under which, in a time of water shortage, each
landowner is entitled to a share of the underlying water in proportion to the
amount of land he owns as compared with the total area supplied by the com-
mon water source. While this provides little assurance to developers unfamiliar
with the hydrologic data necessary to estimate long range water supplies and
may take no account of the relative value of different uses to be made to the
community, it squarely faces the problem of the tragedy of the commons.
However, neither the reasonable use nor correlative rights rule succeeds
in removing the basic drawbacks of judicial administration of groundwater
distribution, assuming that the judiciary is charged with that responsibility. The
hydrologic data required for adequate information about supply, evaporation
and movement of groundwater are initially expensive to obtain and the courts
do not have sufficient staff assistance to do that job. Consequently, parties
rnt supply experts and they are acquired only at considerable expense.
Adequate information usually requires long term collection of data on the
interdependence of water, weather and land use in a particular locality.
Moreover, the courts have a long, but not particularly laudable record, of
ignoring scientific developments in the field of groundwater. They are certainly
not expert agencies from an engineering perspective, and may gain little from
listening to the opposing views of scientists who are hired by the opposing
255 See, e.g., MacArtor v. Graylyn Cress III Swim Club, 41 Del. Ch. 26 (1963); Higday
v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1971); State v. Michels Pipeline Construction
Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278 (1973).
2011 Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d at 867 (Mo. 1971).
257 MacArtor v. Graylyn Cress III Swim Club, 41 Del. Ch. 26 (1963).
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parties. This is especially shown by the cases where parties seek injunctions
to prevent harms they have not yet suffered." 8 The courts require the clearest
kind of proof which is frequently not forthcoming for various reasons. In
many cases parties frequently must wait for the dubious remedies available
after the harm has occurred.
Judicial failure to achieve rational distribution of groundwater supplies
in the course of litigation, and the establishment of rules which do not reflect
physical reality are, of course, not only harmful to the litigants but also to the
community. As a result, a permit system administered by a branch of the state
government has been adopted in most western states and in some central and
eastern ones (e.g., Indiana, Iowa, Florida) for various reasons. In Ohio, there are
growing areas of water shortage and the State Assembly hearings in the sum-
mer of 1974 attest to a need in Ohio for some method of assurance of adequate
groundwater supplies, especially in those areas which are "critically" short."5 9
Recommendations of the National Water Commission
Compared to Ohio Law
The Final Report of the National Water Commission, 6 ' published in
1973 and undertaken pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 90-515 for
the purpose of recommending policies which the nation shofild adopt for the
efficient, equitable and environmentally responsible management of its water
resources, speaks to the problems of groundwater management. The
Commission recognized three principal problems of groundwater law,
management and administration: (1) the integration of management of
surface and groundwater; (2) the depletion of groundwater aquifers at rates
exceeding recharge (mining groundwater); and, (3) the impairment of
quality. The Commission's recommendations to solve problems one and two
are worth noting for Ohio because, as will be seen, Ohio's common law
does not coincide with these recommendations.
As shown in the case of Warder0 ' and the Problem Cases dealing with
the interference of groundwater supplies from quarrying, mining and road
construction, there is often a natural interrelation between surface and
258 Id.
259 See OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMM'N, AGRICULTURAL GROUNDWATER SURVEY,
STUDY REPT. No. 7 at 2, reports:
... six of the counties considered the water supply situation "critical" for more
than 50% of the farm residents in that county who are dependent upon ground-
water. The questionaire in asking this question defined "critical" to mean that "the
farmer's ground water supply is or may be inadequate to carry on normal farming
operations, not including irrigation, and that he has no feasible alternative surface
supply-i.e. he is, or is about to be, out of water."
260 NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE (1973).
261 9 Ohio Doe. Reprint 855 (1855).
[Vol. 9:1
63
Coogan: Problems of Groundwater Rights in Ohio
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1976
PROBLEMS OF GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN OHIO
groundwater. Recommendation No. 7-1 of the Commission is that states
should recognize this integration, that rights in both sources of supply should
be integrated, and uses should be administered and managed conjunctively.
Further, it recommends that there should not be a separate codification of
surface water law and groundwater law, rather the law of waters should be a
single, integrated body of jurisprudence. With the exception of the holding
in Warder, this recommendation is contrary to Ohio's common law.
The Commission recommendation No. 7-2 is that where surface and
groundwater supplies are interrelated and where it is hydrologically indicated,
maximum use of the combined resource should be accomplished by laws
and regulations authorizing or requiring users to substitute one source for
another. Clearly, this recommendation cannot be executed in Ohio under
the prevailing conflict between the laws of surface riparian rights and the
rule of Frazier without comprehensive legislative action.
In its recommendation No. 7-3, the Commission suggests that states, in
which groundwater is an important source of supply (as it is locally in Ohio),
commence conjunctive management of surface and groundwater through
public management agencies. This approach was recommended as part of
the legislative hearings in Ohio in 1974. In addition, there are several surface
water conservation agencies extant in Ohio, including the Three Rivers
Watershed District. Others are provided for by Chapter 6105 of the Ohio
Revised Code. Their powers touch on, but do not comprehensively begin
to afford, the proper management of groundwater supplies. Recommendation
No. 7-4 suggests the establishment of such water management agencies and
outlines the potential powers, including financial, acquisition and alienation
of property, operations, and authorization to sue and be sued.
Finally, the Commission recommended in No. 7-5 that states adopt laws
and regulations to protect groundwater aquifers from injury, with the right of
enforcement available to both private property owners and public officials. As
envisioned, the regulations would cover activities likely to be harmful to
aquifers from activities not related to water use, such as mining or
construction, which could interfere with recharge, removing support by
subsidence or lateral support as discussed in previous Problem Cases.
Knowledge and Knowability in Groundwater Law
As the court in Erickson so succinctly put it: "The distinction between
rights in surface and underground waters is not founded upon the fact of their
location above or below the ground, but on the fact of knowledge with
reference thereto." ' This is the problem which Judge Brinkerhoff confronted
in the Frazier case. Where knowledge of the groundwater situation did exist,
262 105 Minn. 182 (1908).
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either because it was "notorious,"" or as a result of scientific study, "' some
courts have said there is a liability for interference.
The Labruzzo2 65 case suggests that a negligence approach is proper.
Following that line of reasoning, a standard could be applied which related
liability to knowledge. The crux of the problem is how to apply the standard
in the case of domestic wells or in cases where the supply development was
not the activity that caused the interference. In the first instance, the question
could be: Did the interferor know or have reason to know that the activity
would materially affect the interferee's water supply? In the case of substantial
commercial developers, industrial developers, national, state and local
governments, the contracting of a groundwater study, drilling by a commercial
drilling contractor, an engineering firm or a governmental agency might be
presumptive evidence or at least an indication or test that knowledge of the
groundwater situation existed.2" Admittedly, the problem does not go away.
In MacArtor, the court essentially applied strict liabiliy to the interferor, after
the fact, on the basis of the reasonable use rule saying that such procedures
allowed the court to consider the intentions of the offending party and his
actions subsequent to the discovery of the consequences of his use of the
water. One might ask why go to the intentions, why not just consider
the effect of knowledgeable interference?
The MacArtor court's approach is similar to the strict liability of Rylands,
i.e., the duty is absolute. The test is: Did the damage occur and was the
defendant's action the cause of it? Similar strict liability is applied to damage
from oil well drilling in various states, e.g., California. In the case of domestic or
individual well development, the knowledge would have to be pled and proven.
Current important problems are related to large groundwater supply
needs, large pumpers, large scale earth works and projects with intentional or
negligent interferences. Thus, in many permit states, and proposed for Ohio
in the so-called critical groundwater areas, only persons planning to exploit
supplies over a certain amount (e.g., 50,000 gallons per day) need permits. A
permit system is essentially an appropriation system, but works only for large
pumpers, inasmuch as domestic supplies generally are excluded by the
minimum amount. It is believed here that the permit system is the eventual,
even inevitable, outcome of attempts to manage groundwater supplies in water
scarce areas. Neither the permit system nor use of one of the common law
263 Castalia Trout Club v. Castalia Sporting Club, 8 Ohio C. Dec. 693 (1893).
264 Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1971 ).
26554 So. 2d 673 (Fla., 1951). But this conflicts with tort liability for groundwater inter-
ference as stated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 858A (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1973).
26GSee, e.g., Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1971).
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doctrines necessarily protects all rights in groundwater or damage caused by
groundwater. Nor, will such a system necessarily reduce litigation. - 7
Where water rights are viewed as solely property rights, there is a
tendency for courts to reinforce positions close to the absolute rule doctrine.
Water rights viewed similarly to "rights to clean air" tend to lead to a
reasonable use doctrine or a permit system. It is not the objective here to
describe a system for Ohio, but whatever is adopted should be adopted in the
light of ways to manage groundwater supplies and not on the basis of assigning
liability. Whatever is done must be done in such a way as to face the problem
of groundwater rights and development practices which vary tremendously from
the farmer who digs a sandpoint well along his creek ten feet deep to munici-
palities establishing groundwater supplies of millions of gallons a day for sale.
Concerning rights to production of water (and disregarding the physical
damage Problem Cases), it seems that a combination of a permit system
under the aegis of a state agency and the reasonable use rule with a "knowledge
v. knowability" test, would better provide Ohio with a basis for development
of groundwater resources in the next few decades as it becomes a water-short
area in various regions. Such an approach would tend to leave unregulated
the small developer, commercial and small industrial users in a realm of
land use which has unique difficulties.
Rephrased, this means that the citizens and local governments of Ohio
have no capability or authority now to manage groundwater supplies which
are in the ground-even in their own land-in the face of other demand. Ohio's
groundwater common law, excepting the law applied to the interference with
riparian rights and destruction of support, protects no supply which is not
physically secure. The management recommendations cited above are minimal
ones, but are in line with national recommendations for groundwater supply
management. The inadequacies of Ohio's common law are known. Appropriate
regulatory and legislative responses have been drafted. What remains is for
the public and its public officials to recognize the need and demand the
appropriate legislative response.
267 Compare Problem Case 3, 5 and 11.
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Groundwater Problem Cases List
CASE NO. FIGURE
Interference with Groundwater Supply
1. Interference with groundwater supply to a well by pumping of another well . . . 5-8
2. Interference with a flowing spring fed by groundwater by pumping of a well . . . 9
3. Interference with groundwater supply by surface excavation below the water table 10
4. Interference with groundwater supply by reducing pressure in the reservoir;
supply is still present but with less head ...... ....................... 11
5. Interference with groundwater supply by pumping from mines ... .......... 12
6. Interference with groundwater supply by changing
flow lines due to subsurface mining ........ ......................... 12
7. Interference permanently with groundwater supply by destruction of reservoir
capacity owing to collapse of reservoir internally due to mining of groundwater 13
8. Interference with groundwater supply
by diversion of a stream from its original bed ...... ................... 14
9. Interference with groundwater supply by diversion of water from a stream for use
(e.g., pumping from stream or dammed lake and diversion) .... ............ 15
10. Interference with groundwater supply by reducing the level
of an artificial surface reservoir ........ ........................... 16
11. Interference with groundwater supply by surface drainage
projects, for example, swamp reclamation ...... ..................... 17
12. Interference with groundwater supply by paving
or other destruction of the infiltration (recharge) area ..... ............... 18
13. Interference with groundwater supply
by subsurface grouting or cementing in mines.
14. Interference with groundwater supply by well drilling procedures
such as mud programs and grouting (but not pollution).
15. Interference with groundwater supply by cavity utilization.
16. Interference with groundwater supply by damage to the water
from encroachment of salt water into the freshwater supply along a coast line 19
17. Interference with groundwater supply by rise in
groundwater table from an artificial reservoir ...... ................... 20
Interference with Surface Water Supply
18. Interference with stream flow by use of a groundwater supply .............. 21
19. Interference with the level of a surface reservoir or lake
by use of a groundwater supply ........ ........................... 22
Damage to Other Activities and Property by use of Groundwater Supply
20. Damage to a mine from withdrawal of groundwater ..... ................ 23
21. Damage to cavity utilization by withdrawal of groundwater .... ............ 24
22. Damage to overlying surface by withdrawal of groundwater
(collapse, subsidence, cracking, etc.) ....... ........................ 25
23. Damage to surface of adjacent land by withdrawal of groundwater
from a mine, quarry or other excavation ....... ...................... 26
24. Damage to groundwater supply by surface collapse
or subsidence from underground mining ....... ...................... 27
25. Damage from slide conditions enhanced by increase in groundwater supply and
rise in water table owing to artificial recharge from surface reservoir
or groundwater reservoir ......... .............................. 28
26. Damage from flooding of surface from increased supply and rise of the
groundwater table owing to recharge from a surface reservoir .............. 29
27. Damage to surface by soil compaction owing to draw-down of groundwater
table and consequential collapse or shrinkage of soil ..... ................ 30
28. Damage from landslides around a reservoir caused by rapid fall
of water table caused by lowering of the reservoir ..... ................. 31
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APPENDIX B
Illustrations of Groundwater Problem Cases
Fig. 1. Illustration of various definitions of an underground stream based on legal pronounce-
ments and geologic conditions.
A. Line of trees where "no where found except where streams occur,"
Symbols for Figures
Limestone 0cp 0 Conglomerate
. Shale,Clay, or Soil Coal
Sand or Sandstone ! Silt or Siltstone
i .; Water Saturated Unsaturated
Rock, Sl,etc. Rock, Soil, etc.
Water Level Before Pumping or Interference
---- Water Level After Pumping or Interference
Dry Well Location / Direction of Water
FlowO Production Well
Location Drainage Pump
Fault Trace; Arrows Show
the Relative Directions of
Earth Movement
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A. Line of trees where "nowhere found except where streams occur,"
i.e., subbed percolating water flow.
B. Percolating water in valley fill. Note banks and channel.
C. Buried valley of pre-"A" stream filled with water-bearing porous
sediment. Note channel, banks, gradient of flow.
D. Fault line between Paleozoic limestone (uplifted) and Tertiary-
Quarternary sediments. Rising water along fault line flows out as
springs into a lake.
Fig. 2. An underground stream in limestone terrain, having disappeared into a sinkhole, flows
underground as a turbulent stream and emerges as a spring and stream. Note the underground
is undetectable from the surface without excavation at point of well.
.2 otere, ..
": : .::': :::3: , :W fj ,
a "ou Watr
N C. - 9 ' *. ;. .
Fig. 3. Illustration of various conditions of groundwater.
1. Zone of aeration is portion of rock where pores are not saturated with
water.
a. Soil water zone is where water is held near surface in the pores of the
soil zone.
b. Capillary fringe zone is where water is held in pores by capillary
forces.
c. Intermediate zone is where there is a fluctuation of the level of water
depending on the wetness of the season.
2. Zone of saturation is the zone where pores are filled with groundwater
either in:
a. unconsolidated sediment; or,
b. in rock.
3. Groundwater table is the fluctuating interface between the zone of
aeration and saturation.
[Vol. 9r. I
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Fig. 4. Illustration of Terms.
1. Surface stream.
2. Water table is interface between zone of saturation and areation.
3. Confining beds are beds with porosity and permability so low as to
effectively prevent water movement through the rock. They are also
called aquicludes.
4. An artesian aquifer is a porous and permable bed carrying water which
when tapped by a well has sufficient head to provide water to the
surface without pumping.
5. No. 1. Water table in unconsolidated surficial materials.
6. No. 2. Elevation of water table in the confined artesian aquifer.
.. 
. .
Fig. 5. Interference with groundwater supply to one well by heavy pumping and drawdown of
the water table by another well.
Summer, 1975]
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A
Groundwater level before pumping.
Groundwater level after pumping.
Contour interval 10feet
Water levels given in elevation
above mean sea level
NI 2
Scale In Miles
L[j City of VanWert
LEGEND
Fig. 6. Elevation of groundwater table in the vicinity of Van Wert, Ohio, before and after
pumping by large industrial users. Map modified by Eagon 123, Fig. 5.
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,' - Groundwater level before pumping- N
Sc
.0O ' Change in groundwater level.
Contour interval 10 feet
Water levels given in elevation
above mean sea level.
ale in Miles
City of Vn Wert
LEGEND
Fig. 7. Isopachous map of the reduction of groundwater table level in the vicinity of Van
Wert, Ohio, as the result of industrial pumping of groundwater. North and south of Van Wert,
the groundwater table is essentially unaltered. At the edge of the city, it is 40 feet lower than
previous. Modified from Eagon 123, Fig. 7.
m m
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Fig. 8. Geologic cross section of portion of the Van Wert, Ohio, area showing: A. surface
glacial till; B. underlying bedrock limestone aquifer; C. well of heavy industrial pumper,
D. previous water table elevation; and, E. water table after pumping. Line of cross section is
northeast to southwest and is shown on Figs. 6 and 7 as line X-Y. Modified from Eagon 123,
Fig. 7.
Fig. 9. Interference of a well with the supply of groundwater to a spring. Well on higher
ground taps an aquifer in sandstone sharply reducing level of water table locally and removing
much of the natural outflow of the aquifer as the spring which had resulted from the
intersection of the water table with the surface of the land above the shale aquiclude.
[Vol. 9:1
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Fig. 10. Interference of a new road excavation with a groundwater supply to a well. The road
cut lowers the groundwater table from its -natural level in the upper sandstone to the base of
the road excavation where springs form at the intersectibn of the gravel over the shale
aquiclude with the road.
Fig. 11. Complicated interference with groundwater which flows down dip in a confined
sandstone aquifer into which a gas storage facility is established. Increased pressure in the
storage reservoir prevents water movement into the lower well.
Summer, 1975]
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Fig. 12. Interference with groundwater supply by mining. The mining of the coal along a seam
encounters a sandstone channel formed during the deposition of the sedimentary sequence.
Entry of the groundwater from the sandstone into the mine reduces the head in the sandstone,
lowers the water table and the amount of water available to the well (Case 5). In addition,
pumping of the inflow from the mine increases the rate of flow and further reduces the amount
available to the well (Case 6).
a b
Fig. 13. Destruction of a reservoir. In 13A, the grains are held apart to some extent by the
pressure of the fluid in the pores. In 13B, after complete removal of all but minor capillary
water in the pores, the grains compact owing to the overburden pressure, destroying the pore
space and making the rock incapable of storing fluids.
(Vol. 9:1
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Fig. 14. Interference with an established groundwater supply by the diversion of a stream. The
well, removing groundwater from a supply which is interconnected closely with a stream, goes
dry when the stream water is diverted to provide flow for an artificial channel. Such a channel
could be built to provide passage for ships through locks around the falls of the river, from
a dam to carry water for municipal supplies or agricultural ditches.
7. -- ,
Fig. 15. Loss of groundwater supply to a well by the diversion of stream water for use by a
riparian owner for agricultural sprinkling system on the opposite bank.
Fig. 16. Interference with water supply to wells established at time of high water behind dam.
After br each of dam, water table drops and wells go dry,
Fig. 17. Loss of groundwater by draining swamps. In this case the well is producing from a
groundwater supply connected closely to the surface waters of the swamps. Swamp reclamation
for land development by pumping water causes the well to go dry.
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Fig. 18. Interference with groundwater supply by reduction of the infiltration of surface water
in the recharge area into the saturated zone. Here the paving of the infiltration zone prevents
recharge of part of the storage area causing a fall in the level of the groundwater table locally
so that the well on the left goes dry.
Fig. 19. Damage to the fresh groundwater supply by intrusion of salt water into wells along the
coast line. The pumping of wells on land draws up the salt water which underlies the fresh
water lens contaminating the wells.
A. Area of salt water intrusion.
B. Salt water lens.
C. Marine water.
F. Fresh water lenses.
Fig. 20. The effect of raising the groundwater table by establishment of a surface reservoir
causes flooding of the subsurface property of the adjacent owner making his scenic cave a grotto.
[Vol. 9:1
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Fig. 21. Interference with stream flow by use of the groundwater supply by heavy pumping of
the well which draws through the ground from the streams
Fig. 22. Interference with the level of a reservoir by pumping a water supply from a
groundwater reservoir connected with the surface impoundment. Water moves rapidly through
the porous gravel into the well lowering the lake.
Fig. 23. Damage to a mine from the withdrawal of groundwater. The pumping of water wells
In a sandstone reservoir causes lowering of the water table and solution of the overlying
subsurface formation. Collapse of the limestone by cave formation causes subsurface sinkholes
in the floor of the coal mine.
Summer, 1975]
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Fig. 24. Damage to an underground storage facility by withdrawal of groundwater. The well
pumping from a limestone groundwater reservoir lowers the water table causing solution in the
rock laterally and vertically developing sink holes in the floor of the underground storage cavity.
Fig. 25. Damage to overlying surface by removal of subjacent support by groundwater use. The
lowering of the water table by pumping from a limestone formation causes vertical and lateral
solution which reaches to the surface and results in development of sinkholes, damaging
buildings and other land features.
[Vol. 9:1
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Fig. 26. Damage to adjacent land by withdrawal of groundwater from a quarry on neighboring
property. Pumping of water from the quarry lowers the water table and speeds water flow
through the limestone formation causing solution of the limestone and caving. The caving
reaches the surface where it has its expression as sink holes.
Caivin
-..- ..-- S:" -' - -:"-
- .-... .... . .......
Fig. 27. Physical damage to a groundwater supply by surface collapse or subsidence by loss of
subjacent support. The mining of the coal without leaving sufficient support pillars for the roof
of the mine results in collapse of the overlying strata to the surface and physical destruction of
the well.
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Fig. 28. Damage from a landslide caused by the rise of the water table and lubrication of a
fault along which the slide occurs or reoccurs. A-D, different geologic formations of varied rock
types. Arrows indicated movement along fault. Illustration shows surface cracks in slide
breccia. Failure along base of formation C results in downhill movement to cause a large
slide deposit covering dam lake and dam. Adapted from the Viont Dam disaster in Italy.
Fig. 29. Damage to adjacent land by flooding of the land from seepage through the ground.
The higher water table established by the impoundment of water surface behind the dam
spreads laterally.
[Vol. 9:1
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Fig. 30. Damage to the land surface and features by the lowering of the water table owing to
an excavation for a new road. The lower water table causes shrinkage of surface clays which are
normally saturated and sensitive. Cracking of the surface extends into and through the build-
ings. On the opposite side on the oversteepened face of the road cut a landslide has occurred.
Fig. 31. Lowering of the level of an artificial surface reservoir lowers the water table causing a
landslide along the edge of the reservoir causing potential damage.
Sumner, 1975]
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